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A constitution is a social contract that sets out the rules that govern the way a society
makes collective decisions. Despite diﬀerences in the details, the world￿s constitutions
share a set of common features. All constitutions contain rules that govern how day-to-
day decisions are made, with the most common decision rule being the simple majority
rule. The vast majority of constitutions have a formal amendment process that allows the
constitution itself to be changed.1 Many constitutions single out speci￿c policy areas that
are governed by special rules and procedures. A leading example is bills of rights that make
speci￿c rights imperative. The requirement that a referendum is held in relation to certain
types of decisions is another common feature of real world constitutions. Finally, most
constitutions grant certain bodies or individuals the power to veto decisions or introduce
other types of checks and balances.
This paper proposes a normative theory of constitutional design that can explain why
constitutions embody a range of diﬀerent procedures and rules. We are interested in
understanding the multidimensionality or complexity of constitutional rules. In this regard
we depart from most of the recent theoretical work on the subject which focus on a single
rule or procedure at the time.2 Our goal is to demonstrate that many of the rules that
we observe in actual constitutions emerge endogenously in a simple theoretical framework
where constitutional decisions are made from behind the veil of ignorance.
We consider a society with a continuum of individuals. These individuals must choose
between two alternatives A and B.A l t e r n a t i v e B ￿ the status quo ￿ yields the same
level of welfare to all, while alternative A ￿ a reform ￿ creates winners and losers. The
magnitude of the loss depends on the precise nature of the reform and in some cases ￿
when the reform, for example, violates certain fundamental rights ￿ the loss is particularly
large. At the time when the constitutional rules are laid down, individuals do not yet know
whether they will gain or lose from the reform, nor do they know how large the potential
losses are going to be. Thus, the constitution is designed from the original position, behind
a veil of ignorance.
The premise of our analysis is that societies have, repeatedly, to make decisions about
policies that create winners and losers and that diﬀerent policies are associated with diﬀer-
ent cost-bene￿tp r o ￿les. The ￿rst-best constitutional response is to introduce a separate
decision rule for decisions with high and low costs, i.e., cost-dependent majority rules.
This, however, requires that costs can be observed and can be veri￿ed before the decision
is made. For some policies, the costs are known fairly well in advance, while for others it
1According to [24] (page 80), less than 4% of the world￿s constitutions lack such a provision. On the
other hand, [14] shows that all the current constitutions in the 50 U.S. states and in a sample of countries
around the world have been amended at some time or another.
2We discuss the literature in the next section.
2is impossible to known the precise consequences until after implementation. In both cases,
the welfare consequences of a reform cannot be veri￿ed objectively, and the constitutional
rules cannot be contingent on the utility that individuals derive from the policy reforms
adopted. We identify this as the fundamental problem that constitutional designers must
address.
In the ￿rst part of the paper, we consider alternative constitutional responses to this
fundamental problem. We argue that these correspond closely to solutions found in ac-
tual constitutions and identify the circumstances under which each of the alternatives is
preferred to the others by the constitutional designer. The ￿rst and simplest alternative
￿ a majority rule (MR) constitution ￿ is to apply the same majority rule to all types of
decisions. The problem with this alternative is that the constitutional designer wants to
make it diﬃcult to pass policy reforms with high costs, but in order to do so, he has to
make it diﬃcult to pass all policy reforms, including those with low costs. If some reforms,
e.g., because they infringe with basic rights or property, impose very high costs on some
individuals, the optimal single rule may be so strict that it eﬀectively blocks all decision
making ￿ something which is clearly undesirable in itself. The constitutional designer may,
therefore, explore other alternatives.
In those cases where the costs are known before a reform is actually implemented, the
constitutional designer may choose to design rules that attempt to elicit this information
truthfully. We consider two constitutional mechanisms that can achieve this: an incentive
scheme (IS) constitution and a veto rule (VT) constitution. Both of these constitutions
embody two majority rules: a default rule and an alternative that can only be applied
under certain circumstances speci￿ed in the constitution.
The IS constitution allows individuals to request that the alternative rule is used, but
only if they pay a cost, λ. This switching cost is chosen by the constitutional designer to
insure that individuals would only make such a request if the reform involves truly high
costs. This constitution, then, eﬀectively elicits the actual costs associated with policy A
and allows society to employ second-best cost-dependent majority rules. The down-side is
that the switching is a deadweight loss and is incurred every time the need for a switch of
rules arises. We show that the IS constitution is preferable to the MR constitution only in
cases where reforms with high costs rarely come up for a vote, but when they occasionally
do come up, they involve extremely high costs. We argue that the IS constitution is found
in actual constitutions in the form of referenda or citizens￿ initiatives.
The VT constitution uses a diﬀerent procedure to elicit cost information. Societies,
typically, have to consider several policy reforms, say, one each period for a certain number
of periods. The constitutional designer can take advantage of this. The basic idea is simple:
each period, the constitution allows individuals to request that the alternative rule is used
instead of the default rule at no cost, but they can only do so a speci￿cn u m b e ro ft i m e s .
3We interpret a request for a change of rule as a veto. By rationing the number of vetoes, the
constitutional designer can provide incentives for truthful revelation of the actual costs.
The point is that individuals, knowing that there are more decisions to be made than
vetoes allowed by the constitution, are more likely to veto a policy reform with high costs
than one with low costs.3 In the limit when the number of decisions to be made is in￿nite,
the VT constitution can implement the ￿rst-best. For a ￿nite number of decisions, we
show the VT constitution cannot be worse than the MR constitution and that it is at its
best relative to the IS constitution when the cost diﬀerence between reforms with low and
high costs is small and when both types of reforms come up fairly frequently. We argue
that the VT constitution can be found in actual constitutions in the form of veto powers
granted to certain institutions (such as a president or a minority in the legislature).
When the costs of a reform cannot be known until after it has been implemented, the
constitutional designer can employ neither the IS nor the VT constitution, and the only
alternative may appear to be the MR constitution. We argue, however, that it is often
possible to de￿ne classes of reforms ￿ policy areas ￿ that can serve as proxies for the
underlying cost of reforms that fall within those areas. Importantly, we assume that it
is possible, at a cost, to establish objectively if a particular policy reform belongs to one
areas or the other. This allows the constitutional designer to design policy area speci￿c
majority rules as an alternative to the single rule. We show that it is bene￿cial to do so
when the cost of allocating decisions to the correct policy area is low and when policy
areas are informative about the cost of reforms within those areas. We argue that policy
area speci￿c rules are often present in actual constitutions in the form of bills of rights or
as special procedures such as those designed for dealing with rati￿cation of international
treaties or expropriation of property.
In the second part of the paper, we consider the important question of constitutional
change. When all constitutional rules are designed behind the veil of ignorance, there is no
role for constitutional change. A serious theory of constitutional change must, therefore,
take on board the fact that amendment rules are meta-rules that specify how individuals
can change the pre-determined rules of the original constitution after the veil of ignorance
has been lifted. We consider situations where there exist non-veri￿able, external threats to
the welfare of certain individuals in society. When this threat ￿ call it a crisis ￿ varies with
circumstances and when the original constitution cannot be made contingent on these cir-
cumstances, constitutional designers may want to introduce an amendment rule. This rule
allows for constitutional changes to be implemented at a later stage when circumstances
are more clear, but only if suﬃciently many individuals support such amendments. We
show that amendment rules provide the ￿exibility necessary to adapt the constitution to
3See [11] for a general analysis of mechanisms that link several decisions to generate revelation.
4changing circumstances, but this ￿exibility comes at the cost that it must allocate deci-
sion making to a speci￿c group of individuals rather than to someone who takes society￿s
interest as a whole into account. Therefore, amendment rules are optimal only, from the
original position￿s perspective, when it is suﬃciently likely that the threat will be carried
out. In other cases, when this threat is not so signi￿cant, we show that mechanisms that
resemble the procedures for declaring a state of emergency are optimal.
The third part of the paper considers checks and balances, understood as diﬀerent
rules for diﬀerent groups of individuals (as distinguished by wealth levels, geographical
location etc.). The advantage of having checks and balances is that policy reforms cannot
pass without suﬃcient support from all groups. This is in contrast to universal rules
which allow support from one group to compensate for opposition from the other, thereby
allowing policy reforms to pass if enough individual in society at large are in favor. We
show that checks and balances are desirable in heterogeneous societies where some groups
are more likely to suﬀer disproportionately from changes to the status quo than others.
We have chosen a normative approach to constitutional design for a variety of reasons.
Firstly, this assumption maps nicely with the notion that constitutional designers are
￿founding fathers￿. If the individuals who design constitutions care suﬃciently about the
future, they will be careful not to design a constitution that makes it either too easy or
too diﬃcult to select reforms because while they might, for example, gain from today￿s
reforms, they might lose from tomorrow￿s reforms. Secondly, any ￿positive￿ theory of
constitutional design crucially relies on the details of the bargaining process between the
parties. In contrast, with a normative approach, we are able to generate results which do
not rely on anything else other than the veil of ignorance assumption.4 Finally, a normative
approach provides a benchmark against which actual outcomes might be measured and
there exists ample anecdotal evidence that many of the constitutional rules that arise in
our setup can be found in actual constitutions.
It is clear that our setup ignores many important features of the collective decision
problem that societies faces in reality. In particular, in our model, we ignore all the
agency problems that arise when decision making power is delegated to politicians. In
addition, our policy space is very simple: in eﬀe c tw eh a v eo n l yt w oa l t e r n a t i v e sc h o s e nb y
nature, which diﬀer by the loss in￿icted upon losers. This means that agenda setting is
not an issue and that Condorcet cycles cannot arise (see [1]). On the other hand, all these
simpli￿cations allows use to isolate what we consider to be the fundamental constitutional
problem: individuals that disagree about what should be done but need to make decisions.
Understanding why a simple decision procedure such as the majority rule is, typically, not
suﬃcient to enable societies to resolve this con￿ict adequately is of theoretical as well as
4See [25] for a survey of positive constitutional economics.
5of practical importance.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a short literature review. In
Section 3, we introduce our model. In Section 4, we consider constitutional design under
the assumption that the costs are observed before the decision is made. In Section 5, we
consider constitutional design when the costs are not observed until after decisions are
made and introduce the notion of a policy area. In Section 6, we present a new theory of
constitutional amendment. In Section 7, we study the conditions under which checks and
balances is optimal. Section 8 concludes. The appendix at the end contains many of the
proofs.
2. Related Literature
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the fundamental questions related to
constitutional design.5 In this section, we oﬀer a brief discuss of this literature and relate
our analysis to what has gone on before.
￿ A number of recent papers view constitutions as incomplete social contracts.6 Within
this framework, [1] show that the optimal choice of a majority rule from behind the
veil of ignorance is determined by a trade-oﬀ between two considerations. On the
one hand, the desire to limit excessive ex-post redistribution whereby the majority
expropriates the minority suggests that the majority rule should be strict. On the
other hand, it is desirable to allow enough ￿exibility to circumvent ex-post vested
interests that attempt to block socially desirable reforms. This suggests that the
majority rules should be lax.7 [15] considers a similar problem in the context of
international organization but address the issue of self-enforcement and show that
under certain condition unanimity is the optimal majority rule. [2] propose a related
theory of endogenous political institutions but focus on rules that contain the power
of political leaders. They show that the optimal degree of ￿insulation￿ measured as
the share of votes needed to block legislation (or the size of the supermajority needed
to pass legislation) is determined by a trade-oﬀ between allowing the political leader
enough leeway to rule and restricting the scope for misuse of power. Our approach
shares with these papers the assumption that constitutional choices are made from
behind the veil of ignorance, yet our goal is diﬀerent. We want to understand when
and why particular constitutional rules emerge. Thus, rather than analyzing how
5The classical work in the area is [5]
6[7] presents an overview of this approach. See [13] for an exposition of the alternative view that consid-
ers constitutions as complete contracts and argues that the need for constitutions arises from information
asymmetries. For a theoretical defence of the incomplete contract approach, see [10].
7This approach has been further developed by [8].
6the strictness of one particular (decision) rule varies with changes in the economic
environment, we are interested in the broader question of how the set of optimal rules
itself varies with the environment.8 Although our starting point is that constitutions
are incomplete contracts in the sense that they do not necessarily provide a full state-
contingent plan for all future events, we stress that appropriate responses to certain
future events, in particular those that relate to fundamental rights, can be speci￿ed
in the constitution. This is major departure from the previous work, but one, we
argue, that provides valuable insights into the complexity of real world constitutions.
￿ Some recent papers have argued that constitutions are not written behind the veil of
ignorance but by individuals who know their position in society. [16], for example,
study a situation where the decision rule used to govern future decisions is itself
decided by the majority rule. They ￿nd that supermajority rules emerge in an
overlapping generations framework where the young can decide on the size of the
supermajority that is going to be used to make decisions when they become old.
Assuming that most public policies introduce immediate costs while bene￿ts arrive
later, older voters suﬀer more from reforms than young voters, and this provides
an incentive for young voters to choose a strict rule that is going to apply when
they are old. [23] analyze how economic factors (and in particular redistributive
concerns) in￿uence the choice of a majoritarian system versus a consensual system.
[3] also study the endogenous choice of majority rule in a positive framework and
derive conditions under which voting rules are self-sustaining, that is constitutions
that are likely to endure. In particular, they provide a rationale for the existence of
amendment rules since the ￿exibility they aﬀord allows for more stable constitutions.
We provide a rationale for amendment rules that emphasizes their ￿exibility as well,
but argue that this comes at the cost of partiality and study how the trade-oﬀ
between the two determines the nature of constitutional change.
￿ We show that checks and balances understood as diﬀerent decision rules applied to
diﬀerent groups of individuals (e.g., as in bicameral systems) can be optimal if there
is enough heterogeneity in the population. The function of checks and balances in
our framework is very diﬀerent from that of [20]. They focus on situations where
checks and balances understood as separating decision making power between politi-
cians can reduce agency problems. In our framework, checks and balances provide
protection to groups of voters at risk of experiencing particularly large loses. This is
so because checks and balances in our framework prevents support for alternative A
to be transferred between groups.
8[1] take steps in this direction by analyzing when it would be desirable to introduction various minority
protection rules such as equal tax rates and tax limits.
7￿ Finally, [9] studies a formal model of constitutional change but assumes that changes
are requested and determines the optimal amendment rules as a function of the
pressures from other forms of change (interpretative interventions through legislation
and the courts or, at the other extreme, the possibility of a complete constitutional
crisis).9 Our approach here is entirely diﬀerent as we endogenize the possibility of
change through the choice of the constitution itself.
3. The Basic Setup
We consider a society that must choose between two policies, x ∈ {A,B}. Policy B is the
status quo and policy A is an alternative to the status quo. Policy A should be interpreted
as a reform as in [2]. The society is populated by a continuum of individuals indexed by i.
The population is partitioned into two disjoint groups, denoted W and W C. The utility
function of individual i depends on group aﬃliation and on the policy chosen by society,





wi f x = A and i ∈ W
−yi fx = A, i ∈ WC and c = c
−zi fx = A, i ∈ WC and c = c
0 if x = B
where w>0 and z>y>0. The interpretation is as follows. If policy B is chosen, the
status quo is preserved and all individuals obtain zero utility. If, on the other hand, policy
A is chosen, those individuals who belongs to the set W (the ￿winners￿) gain utility w,
while those who belongs to the set W C (the ￿losers￿) experience a loss. How large this loss
is depends on the nature of the policy reform. We assume that there exists two possible
alternatives to the status quo. Which of these obtains is determined by the realization of
the random variable c. For some policy reforms (c = c), the loss is larger than for others
(c = c). The probability that the costs are low (y)i sη and the probability that they are
high (z)i s1−η. What is important is that the precise nature of policy A cannot be known
until after c has been realized. The timing of events can be summarized by the following
time line:
1. From behind the veil of ignorance, a representative individual (the constitutional
designer) designs a constitution.
2. Nature selects p. p is not observed by individuals.
3. Given p, individuals are partitioned in the two sets W and WC by Nature. Individ-
uals know to which set they belong, but this information is not veri￿able.
9See also [19] and [4].
84. Individuals vote for or against policy A. The vote result is observed by everyone and
is veri￿able.
5. The policy outcome is determined according to the constitutional rules laid down in
1.
Individuals select a constitution (a mechanism) from behind a veil of ignorance without
knowing neither if they will gain from policy A or not nor the precise nature of policy A
(i.e., the realization of c). Once the constitution has been designed in stage 1,n a t u r e
determines who the winners and losers are. This is done by ￿rst selecting a value p from a
cumulative distribution function F with support on the unit interval and strictly positive
density f (stage 2), and then, for each individual i determining whether i ∈ W or not
by a sequence of independent draws from a Bernoulli distribution with p =P r ( i ∈ W) in
stage 3. With a continuum of individuals, p also represents the fraction of individuals who
favor policy A over the status quo. In stage 4, voting takes place. Individuals vote in a
state of aggregate uncertainty: they know whether they are winners or losers, but they do
not know how many winners or losers there are until after the vote has taken place. We
assume that an independent court can verify the number of votes in favor of policy A,t h a t
voting is sincere10, and that an independent judiciary guarantees that the rules prescribed
by the constitution will be enforced and the policy outcome is determined accordingly in
stage 5.
T h et i m el i n ed o e sn o ts p e c i f yw h e nt h ec associated with policy A becomes known.
We consider two cases ￿ both of which have considerable empirical relevance. For some
policies, the welfare consequences are known ex ante, that is, before they are implemented,
but after the is designed. In this case, c is observed by individuals at stage 3. Although
the costs are observed, they cannot, in general, be veri￿ed by a court. For other policies,
the welfare consequences are known only ex post, that is, after they are implemented. In
this case, c is realized after voting takes place in stage 5. In both cases, the constitutional
designer has to ￿nd ways to circumvent the fact that he cannot make the constitutional
rules directly dependent on a key determinant of the desirability of reform (the realization
of c). We begin our inquiry into this by considering the case in which the costs are observed
ex ante and return to the case where they are observed only ex post in section 5.
10This assumption is needed only because our model assumes a continuum of voters. As a consequence,
no individual voter is ever pivotal and any voting strategy, therefore, constitutes equilibrium behavior,
including non-sincere ones. However, for any positive probability of being pivotal, sincere voting would
obtain in our setting because there is only two alternatives. We assume throughout that voting is sincere.
94. Optimal Constitutions When c is Observed Ex Ante
In this section, we characterize optimal constitutions under the assumption that the costs
become known to individuals (in stage 3) before the decision to adopt policy A or not is
made. As a benchmark, we analyze the situation in which c is veri￿able. We demonstrate
that the ￿rst-best is attainable and can be implemented by cost-dependent majority rules.
I nt h er e a l i s t i cc a s ew h e r ec is not veri￿able, the ￿rst-best cannot be attained. We consider
three alternative solutions ￿ a simple majority rule, an incentive scheme, and vetoes ￿ that
in diﬀerent ways attempt to address this fact. We argue that these alternatives employ
constitutional rules that correspond closely to solutions found in actual constitutions and
identify the circumstances under which each of the alternatives is preferred to the others
by the constitutional designer.
4.1. Constitutions with Veriﬁable c
Under the assumption that costs c can be veri￿ed by the courts, it is feasible to write
constitutions that depend directly on c as well as p.W e c a n d e ￿ne a cost-dependent
constitution as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 A cost-dependent (CD) constitution is a pair of majority rules (m,n) with
m ∈ [0,1] and n ∈ [0,1] such that11
x =
‰
Ai f f((p ≥ m) ∧ (c = c)) ∨ ((p ≥ n) ∧ (c = c))
B otherwise
The CD constitution employs two cost-dependent majority rules and policy reforms
with low costs can pass with a m-majority, while policy reforms with high costs can pass
with a n-majority. We are interested in the constitutional mechanism that achieves the
￿rst best outcome, that is, the constitutional mechanism that maximizes expected utility
from the perspective of the original position. The following proposition shows that the
￿rst best constitution is, in fact, a CD constitution:











is the ￿rst-best constitution. Moreover, m∗
FB <n ∗
FB.
11Since we assume that voting is sincere, we can replace, without loss of generality, the measure of votes
in favor of policy A with p, the measure of individuals in favor of policy A.








where µ(c,p)=P r( x = A|c,p) is the probability that policy A will pass under the given
mechanism, conditional on c and p and where
uc (p)=pw − (1 − p)y;
uc(p)=pw − (1 − p)z.
Expected utility is maximized by any mechanism that satis￿es the following conditions:
µ(c,p)=
‰










Given that individuals vote sincerely, the CD constitution with rules (m∗
FB,n ∗
FB) imple-
ments the ￿rst-best. For z>y , m∗
FB <n ∗
FB. ¤
The constitutional designer would ideally like to employ a lenient majority rule m∗
FB for
reforms involving low costs and a strict majority rule n∗
FB for reforms involving high costs.
We notice that these rules are independent of the distribution function F. Intuitively, this
is because the constitution sets out the conditions under which policy A is chosen and
these must be independent of the probability that such conditions obtain.
Cost-dependent constitutions are not feasible when c is unveri￿able: whatever the true
realization of c is, winners always have an incentive to claim that c = c and that the
decision should be made with the lenient rule (m∗
FB), while the losers have the opposite
incentive. Thus, when c is observable, but not veri￿able, the constitutional design problem
is to ￿nd ways to separate policies for which the costs to losers are high from those for
which they are low. As we shall see, there exist mechanisms that can achieve this, but
only at a cost. An implication, then, is that constitutions that depend on p only can in
some cases be preferable.
4.2. Majority Rules
One immediate response to the fact that costs are not veri￿able is to ignore the issue and
focus on p-dependent constitutions that employ one single rule to all decisions and do
not make any attempt to extract information about costs from individuals. Formally, we
de￿ne such a constitution as follows:
11Deﬁnition 2 A Majority-Rule (MR) constitution is a majority rule m ∈ [0,1] such that
x =
‰
Ai f f p ≥ m
Bo t h e r w i s e
The following proposition shows that an appropriately chosen MR constitution is the
optimal constitution within the class of constitutions that solely depend on p.




z − η(z − y)
z + w − η(z − y)
is the optimal p-dependent constitution.
Proof. Write expected utility from behind the veil of ignorance as
Z 1
0
µ(p)[ηuc (p)+( 1− η)uc(p)]dF (p)
where µ(p)=P r ( x = A|p) is the probability that policy A will pass under the given
mechanism, conditional on p alone. Expected utility is maximized by any mechanism that
satis￿es the following condition:
µ(p)=
(




Given that individuals vote sincerely, the MR constitution with m∗
MR implements this. ¤
The optimal MR constitution has one signi￿cant drawback: it applies the same rule to
all decisions. To see the implications of this, suppose z is very large. In that case the MR
constitution will eﬀectively require unanimity to allow policy A to pass (limz→∞ m∗
MR =1 )
￿ even when c = c and the loss is y rather than z.I ne ﬀect, all policy making is blocked
in this example because that is the only way to prevent some really ￿bad￿ outcomes from
happening. Notice that this is true even if these really ￿bad￿ outcomes are very unlikely,
but can happen (i.e., if 1 − η ≈ 0, but positive).
4.3. Incentive Schemes
The costs c are observed by individuals before they vote. Consequently, the constitutional
designer might be able to design a constitutional mechanism through which c is revealed
and in this way allow the constitutional rules to be made contingent on such information.
To explore this possibility, we consider constitutions of the following type. The constitution
prescribes two rules: a default majority rule that is used to make decisions unless some
individuals, at a cost de￿ned in the constitution, request that the decision is made using a
12diﬀerent pre-speci￿ed rule. When the cost of switching from the default to the alternative
rule is chosen appropriately, information about the realization of c can be elicited truthfully,
and decisions can be made using cost dependent rules. The time line is modi￿ed to describe
this situation as follows:
1. From behind the veil of ignorance, a representative individual (the constitutional
designer) designs a constitution.
2. Nature selects p. p is not observed by individuals.
3. Given p, individuals are partitioned in the two sets W and WC by Nature. Individ-
uals know to which set they belong, but this information is not veri￿able. Nature
selects c which is observable but not veri￿able.
4. A representative for the winners j and a representative for the losers k simultaneously
decide how large a cost b σj ≥ 0 and b σk ≥ 0 they are willing to bear to change the
default decision rule laid down in 1 to a pre-determined alternative rule.
5. Individuals vote for or against policy A. The vote result is observed by everyone and
it veri￿able.
6. The policy outcome is determined according to the constitutional rules laid down in
1.
The new feature is stage 4. It describes how much winners and losers are willing
to pay to change the decision rules. For simplicity, we assume that winners and losers,
respectively, are represented by one individual (denoted by j and k) and that these hold
enough resources to cover the cost of changing the majority rule, if they so desire. This
assumption allows us to abstract from free-rider problems, although one could argue that
the costs of changing the majority rule include the costs associated with the free-rider
problem itself. We consider the following class of constitutions that allow a change in the
majority rule if and only if at least one of the representatives is willing to shoulder the
cost of the change:
Deﬁnition 3 An Incentive-Scheme (IS) constitution is a triple (m,λ,n) such that for







(p ≥ m) ∧ (b σj ∧ b σk <λ )
(p ≥ n) ∧ (b σj ∨ b σk ≥ λ)
B otherwise
13where m ∈ [0,1] and n ∈ [0,1] are majority rules and λ ≥ 0 is the cost of changing the
decision rule from to m to n.12
Since the welfare gain (w) bestowed on the winners if policy A passes does not depend
on c, only the representative for the losers has an incentive to incur the cost λ and only if by
doing so, she can guarantee that a stricter majority rule is used to decide the faith of policy
A.13 The crucial task of the constitutional designer is to choose λ, m,a n dn to guarantee
truthful revelation of the costs, allowing for the possibility that it may not be feasible to
elicit the truth. The following proposition characterizes the optimal IS constitution with
deadweight cost λ.
Proposition 3 Assume that c is not veri￿able and de￿ne
η
∗ =
(1 − ψ)y(w + z)
(z − y)((1 − ψ)y + w)
,
where ψ = EF(p).







y − ψ(1 − η)y
η(w + y)
,











is the optimal revelation mechanism with deadweight costs.
2. For η<η ∗, no revelation mechanism with deadweight costs is feasible and the IS
constitution with m = n = m∗
MRand switching cost λ =0is the optimal constitution.
3. η∗ is a decreasing function of z with limz→∞ η∗ =
(1−ψ)y




The proposition highlights an important distinction between situations in which reforms
with high costs are likely (η<η ∗) and situations in which such reforms are unlikely (η>
12Technically speaking, the IS constitution consists of the whole mechanism, not just the majority rules
and the cost λ. However, for notational simplicity, we henceforth use the convention to refer to each
mechanism by the majority rules, costs and announcements associated with it, rather than the whole
game form. This is reasonable to do because these are the elements that have to be optimized by the
constitutional designer.
13The logic can, however, be extended to the case in which w is also a function of c.
14η∗). In the latter case, the constitutional designer selects rules that elicit the information
about the cost truthfully. By de￿ning the switching cost λ such that the losers want to
incur it if and only if policy A is associated with the high cost, z, the constitution can use
cost dependent rules to make decisions. This is what makes the IS constitution attractive.
The downside, of course, is that the cost λ
∗
IS is incurred whenever c = c ￿e v e ni fp>n ∗
IS
(so that A would pass anyway) or p<m ∗
IS (so that A would not pass anyway). Moreover,
the cost dependent rules are only second-best and, thus, not equal to the ￿rst-best rules





the constitutional designer could employ the ￿rst-best rules, but only by increasing the




IS.P a r t1 of the proposition shows that it is
optimal to distort the two majority rules in order to reduce the switching cost. Thus, the
constitutional designer trades oﬀ the utility cost of reducing the diﬀerence between the
two majority rules against the bene￿t of reducing the switching cost.
Part 2 of the proposition shows that it is not always possible to elicit information
about the costs. As noted above, the constitutional designer is willing to reduce the
diﬀerence between the two cost-dependent majority rules to reduce the switching cost.
When it is likely that reforms are associated with high costs (η<η ∗) and the switching
cost is incurred frequently, reducing the switching cost becomes the dominant concern.
An implication then is that the constitutional designer reduces the switching cost to zero
by employing the same majority rule to all decisions. This eﬀectively corresponds to the
optimal MR constitution (see proposition 2).14 Part 3 of the proposition shows that the
critical value η∗ is lower the larger z is. This is because the bene￿ts of using separate cost
dependent rules is larger when the costs associated with the two types of reforms is large.
However, there is a limit to what an increase in z can do: if η is too small (η<
(1−ψ)y
w+y(1−ψ)),
even very large values of z are not suﬃcient to make a constitution with two separate rules
optimal.
It is important to emphasize that the switching cost λ
∗
IS is a deadweight loss to society.
If we were to allow for transfers between winners and losers, truthful revelation could
be obtained irrespectively of the parameters of the model. However, there are several
important reasons why we do not consider transfers. Firstly, in our model (and often in
the real world), it is very diﬃcult to verify the identify of winners and losers. Eﬀectively
the only possibility is to have an open ballot and write into the constitution that if majority
rule n is to be used instead of m, then anyone who votes against policy A must make a
payment to those who vote for policy A in exchange for the higher threshold. The problem
is that an unavoidable consequence of open ballots is vote trading. In a direct democracy,
14Technically speaking, this corresponds to the corner solution with λ =0 .
15vote trading might lead to ineﬃciencies15 and bad redistributive outcomes16 so that it is
often forbidden. Secondly, even if ballots were open and vote trading were not a problem,
in a direct democracy, any transfer system would be liable to signi￿cant deadweight losses
of its own. Finally, monetary transfers are vulnerable to the fact that only rich individuals
may be able to pay. This introduces a disparity between someone￿s ability to pay the
necessary transfer and the willingness to do so.
Against this background, we argue that proposition 3 is mostly relevant in relation to
direct democracy, and referenda and citizens￿ initiatives are two important examples of
what we have in mind. These, typically, allow legislation to be passed (or to be cancelled)
using a diﬀerent (stricter) majority rule than the default (simple) majority rule, but to
trigger a referendum or a citizens￿ initiative, a cost has to paid. In most cases, this cost
is simply the requirement that the proposer collects a certain number of valid signatures
to support the referendum, and the cost (including the cost of overcoming the free-rider
problem) of doing so is clearly a deadweight cost.17 In legislatures, on the other hand, open
ballots are much more common because voters need information on the performance of
their representatives, and the deadweight costs or fairness issues associated with transfers
are less likely to be a problem. In these cases, we would expect informal bargaining
arrangements (e.g. logrolling as in the US Congress) to provide an alternative the IS
constitution described here. In conclusion, then, our analysis suggests that provisions
for referenda and citizens￿ initiatives are included in real constitutions to deal with rare
reforms which, if adopted, yield disproportionately large losses.
4.4. Vetoes
Societies need to make decisions about reforms repeatedly. This fact can be exploited by
constitutional designers to overcome the problem that the costs of these reforms cannot be
veri￿ed. To see the basic idea, which is described in detail in [11], suppose that society has
to make t decisions, one in each of t periods.18 As above, the constitution prescribes two
15[21], in the spirit of the Condorcet jury theorem, argues that voting can eﬃciently aggregate private
signals about policy reforms. Thus, even though vote trading may increase eﬃciency by allowing individu-
als with little interest in a policy to sell their votes to individuals with more at stake, valuable information
may be lost in the process.
16Open ballots are often associated with corruption and blackmail. [12] show how the post-war electoral
system in Italy eﬀectively allowed for open ballots. Since each voter could express a preference for up to
four candidates within a particular party list, politicians could exchange favors with voters by requesting
that they express their vote with a pre-determined pattern of preferences. When the ballots were counted,
an accomplice of the politician, could then check that the voter had kept his or her end of the bargain.
The system was perceived to be so corrupt that a referendum was passed in 1991 that changed the number
of preferences that can be expressed from four to one.
17For an example, see chapter 2, title 4 of the Swiss Federal Constitution.
18[11] study a model which is much more general than the one considered here and show how veto
mechanisms lead, asymptotically, to full revelation. In contrast, we apply the idea of a veto mechanism
16rules: a default rule m a n da na l t e r n a t i v er u l en. The new feature is that the constitution
allows individuals (in equilibrium, losers) to request that rule n is used instead of rule m
at no cost, b u tt h e yc a no n l yd os oas p e c i ￿ed number of times s ≤ t.19 We interpret a
switch of rule as a veto and s is then the number of vetoes allowed by the constitution.
By rationing the number of vetoes, the constitutional designer can provide incentives for
truthful revelation of the costs of reform. The point is that losers, knowing that there
are more decisions to be made than vetoes, are more likely to veto a policy reform with
high costs than one with low costs. To capture these ideas, we modify the time line is as
follows:
1. From behind the veil of ignorance, a representative individual (the constitutional
designer) designs a constitution.
2. Nature selects p. p is not observed by individuals.
3. Given p, individuals are partitioned in the two sets W and WC by Nature. Individ-
uals know to which set they belong, but this information is not veri￿able.
4. Nature makes t draws of the random variable c ￿ one for each of the t policy decisions
to be made. All draws are observable, but not veri￿able.
5. For each policy decision υ ∈ {1,...,t} for which at least one veto is still available, the
two representatives j and k simultaneously make announcements χυ
j,χ υ
k ∈ {∅,V}.
6. Individuals vote for or against policy A. The vote result is observed by everyone and
it veri￿able.
7. Policy outcome is determined according to the constitutional rules laid down in 1.
We interpret an announcement χυ = V at time υ from one of the two representatives
as a veto against the policy decision being made using the default majority rule mVT and
a (possibly implicit) request that the decision is made with the alternative majority rule
nVT. An announcement χυ = ∅ then corresponds to a decision not to veto. For simplicity,
we assume that the winners and losers are the same each period, but that the policy reform
to our simple constitutional design problem and look for the optimal veto mechanism and compare it to
the alternatives (the MR or the IS constitution) for a given t.
19Throughout, we assume that there is no discounting between periods. However, we can capture the
eﬀects of discounting by treating t as a parameter of the model and analyzing how the mechanism performs
for diﬀerent values of t with large t corresponding to a more patient society.
17diﬀers from period to period.20 Let sb υ be the number of vetoes remaining at time b υ ≤ t,
i.e., the total number of vetoes (s) minus the number of vetoes already used. Formally:









We can then de￿ne a constitution with veto rules as a mechanism that allows representa-
tives from winners and losers to veto the use of majority rule mVT, but only if there are
still vetoes left. Formally,
Deﬁnition 4 A veto rule (VT) constitution is a triple (mVT,n VT,s VT) such that in any
period υ for which sυ =0
x =
‰
Ai f f(p ≥ mVT)
B otherwise




















Before we proceed with the characterization of the optimal VT constitution, it is useful







tH(s,t) if 0 ≤ s ≤ t − 1
m ∈ [0,m ∗









tG(s,t) if 1 ≤ s ≤ t
n ∈ [m∗
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H(s,t)=( 1 − η)t + G(s,t) − s.
With these de￿nitions in place, we can characterize the optimal VT constitution as follows.
20This assumption can be relaxed. If p were drawn each period and a new set of winners and losers
were determined, we get qualitatively similar results, but the veto constitution would be less eﬃcient.











where m(s∗) is given in equation (4.1), n(s∗) is given in equation (4.2), and the optimal








2. s∗ is unique and for t>1, 0 <s ∗ <t .







To develop intuition for these results, it is useful to begin by assuming that the number
of decisions t is large enough to allow an accurate approximation of the binomial distri-
bution with the normal. This, in turn, allows us to approximate the optimal number of












































(p(w + z) − z)dF(p).
Equation (4.4) reveals an important trade-oﬀ. The left hand side represents the expected
costs of allowing too many vetoes. This cost arises because of the possibility that a decision
with low costs is vetoed and thus determined by the stricter alternative rule when it should
have been decided with the laxer default rule. The per-period cost of this is ϑ1 (m∗
VT,n ∗
VT)
and the problem arises with probability Φ(.). The right hand side represents the expected
cost of allowing too few vetoes. This cost arises because of the possibility that a decision
with high costs is not vetoed and thus determined by the default rule when it should have
been decided by the alternative rule. The per-period cost of this is given by ϑ2 (m∗
VT,n ∗
VT)
and the problem arises with probability 1 − Φ(.). We, therefore, see that the optimal
number of vetoes exactly balances these two concerns. Importantly, when more than one
21The solution to the ￿rst order condition will, in general, not be an integer. Thus, the approximate
optimal number of vetoes is the nearest integer to the solution. The details are shown in the appendix
where it is established that the second order condition is satis￿ed and that the solution is interior.
19decision has to be made, it is never optimal to eliminate one of the two costs entirely by
allowing either no vetoes or a veto for every decision. This is accomplished by adjusting
the majority rules (and thus, the costs) accordingly.
An immediate consequence of the fact that 0 <s ∗ <tfor t>1 is that the MR
constitution can never yield higher expected utility than the optimal VT constitution. To
see this, notice that the MR constitution arises as a special case of the VT constitution
when s =0or s = t.I fs =0 ,m a j o r i t yr u l em is used for all decisions because no vetoes
are allowed, while if s = t all decisions will be vetoed by the representative of the losers
and majority rule n is eﬀectively used for all decisions. In both cases, the appropriate
choice for the (single) majority rule is m∗
MR. The constitutional designer can, however, do
better by allowing some, but not all, decisions to be vetoed. For example, suppose that








We see that m(1) and n(1) are closer to the ￿rst-best rules than m∗
MR. When the reforms
in period 1 and 2 are associated with diﬀerent costs, it is desirable to use majority rules
that are closer to the ￿rst-best rules than the MR rule. However, when the two reforms are
associated with the same cost, then one of the two decisions will be made with a rule that
is worse than the MR rule. By appropriately choosing m(1) and n(1), the constitutional
designer can always guarantee that the bene￿ts are greater than the costs, and this is the
reason why it is not, in general, optimal to use the ￿rst-best majority rules.
As the number of decisions (t) becomes larger, it is, however, easier for the constitu-
tional designer to insure that there are neither too many nor too few vetoes available. In
the limit (as t →∞ ) the optimal VT constitution achieves the ￿rst-best, as in [11].22 An
implication, then, is that the VT constitution yields higher expected utility than the IS
constitution for a suﬃciently large t, regardless of the other parameters of the model. The
interesting question, therefore, is to ask: how many policy decisions t∗ does it take for the
VT constitution to yield higher expected utility than the IS constitution, and how does
the critical value t∗ depend on the cost z and the probability (1−η)t h a tr e f o r m sw i t hs u c h
costs come up for a vote? To answer this question, we present some simulation results in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 showing t∗ as a function of (1 − η) and z, respectively.23
22The main diﬀerence between the VT constitution and the mechanism considered by [11]i st h a tw e
allow the rules to be determined optimally, while Jackson and Sonnenschein ￿ using the notation of our
model ￿ set s =( 1− η)t and employ what would correspond to the ￿rst-best majority rules. Thus, for
￿nite t the VT constitution welfare dominates this alternative, and it is, therefore, not surprising that the


















z = 200 46 36 22 15 10 7 2 2 2
z = 100 41 30 18 12 8 4 2 2 2
z =1 0 16 8 4 3 2 2 2 2 2
Table 4.1: The critical number of decisions as a function of the probability of high costs
z 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1 − η =1 /4 6 10 13 16 17 18 20 21 22 22
1 − η =1 /2 2 3 4 5 6 7 7 8 8 8
1 − η =1 6 /27 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 5
Table 4.2: The critical number of decisions as a function of z
The tables show that the critical value t∗ is large when it is unlikely that reforms are
associated with high costs and/or the cost z is large. This is as one would expect based on
the analysis in section 4.3: the IS constitution performs well precisely in situation where
reforms with high costs only come up for a vote at rare occasions, but when they do, the
costs associated with them are very high. In contrast, when z is low and/or it is likely
that reforms are associated with high costs, the VT constitution is better than the IS
constitution even for 2 or 3 decisions.
Our analysis shows that the VT and the IS constitution cannot be worse than the
MR constitution. At the same time, for t<∞, all three constitutions fail to reach the
￿rst-best. One way then to measure the eﬃciency gains associated with the VT and the
IS constitution relative to the MR constitution is to look at deviations from the ￿rst-best.
To this end, we de￿ne the following eﬃciency scores









i = IS, VT,
where EU∗ indicated the optimized expected utility associated with the relevant constitu-
tion. This eﬃciency score has the advantage that it normalizes the eﬃciency loss associated
with the IS and VT constitution relative to the benchmark loss associated with the MR
constitution. Thus, EFi is 100 if constitution i achieves the ￿rst-best and 0 if the consti-
tution cannot improve upon the MR constitution. In table 4.3, we report eﬃciency scores
for the IS and VT constitution for diﬀerent values of z and 1−η.E a c hc e l lh a st w oe n t r i e s :
VT constitution implements the ￿rst-best allocation when t →∞ .
23The numerical simulations are performed in Mathematica version 5. The program is available upon
request. All simulations set w = y =1and assume that F is uniform on [0,1].I nt h es i m u l a t i o n s ,w ed o
not make use of the normal approximation, and the exact optimal integer value of s is calculated from
equation (4.3). Note that for certain parameter con￿gurations, η<η ∗ and the IS constitution becomes































































































































































































































Table 4.3: The eﬃciency scores for the VT (upper entry) and IS (lower entry) constitutions
for diﬀerent values of z and 1-eta
the upper entry it ESVT and the lower entry is ESIS.24
The table shows a positive correlation between ESIS and ESVT. That is, the VT and
IS constitution perform well in the same circumstances, namely, when reforms with high
costs are unlikely, but when they come up, they are associated with very large costs. This
is because this is precisely the circumstances under which the MR constitution performs
poorly: it speci￿es a majority rule close to one to deal with the high value of z even
though in most cases reforms only entail modest costs (y). It is interesting to consider the
diﬀerence between the maximum eﬃciency and the minimum eﬃciency score for the two
constitutions along the 1 − η dimension for diﬀerent values of z.C o n s i d e r ,f o r e x a m p l e ,
z = 100.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h em a x i m u me ﬃciency score for the VT (IS) constitution is 82.98
(96.97)f o r1 − η = 1
100, but falls to 9.77 (0)f o r1 − η = 9
10. Thus, both constitutions
perform much worse when reforms with high costs (of 100) are likely than when they are
unlikely. Contrast this with the case where z =1 .1.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ed i ﬀerence between
the maximum and the minimum eﬃciency score for the VT constitution is modest, while
the IS constitution￿s performance is uniformly poor. Thus, the VT constitution performs
well overall for low values of z while the IS constitution does not.
It is reasonable to assume that in actual constitutional design, when the diﬀerence in
performance between a complex mechanism and a simple one is small, the latter is more
likely to be chosen. In our model, IS and VT constitutions are never worse than MR
constitutions, but they are much more complex. Table 4.3, then, suggests that the VT
constitution will be particularly important for those cases in which z is relatively low since
the cases in which z is relatively high are already well taken care of by the IS constitution
24The simulations are performed in Mathematica version 5. All simulations use w = y =1and t =3 0
and assume that F is uniform. Clearly, the eﬃciency score of the VT constitution depends on t.W ef o c u s
on the changes in eﬃciency given by changes in η and z for a given t and note that these comparative
statics are qualitatively independent of precise value of t.
22(when η is high) or the MR constitution (when η is low). Thus, we would expect real
world constitutions to embody veto rules when the cost diﬀerence between diﬀerent types
of reforms is small.
5. Policy Areas
In some cases, the magnitude of the cost of a reform cannot be known until after the
reform has actually been introduced. In such cases, the constitution can obviously not
make use of information about costs or attempt to elicit them truthfully as above. The
only possibility open to the constitutional designer may appear to be the MR constitution.
In reality, however, constitutions often include special provisions or rules that apply to
particular policy decisions, along with a simple majority rule used for all other decisions.
A careful look at these special provisions reveals that they are never contingent on the
potential welfare consequences of a particular policy. Rather, special provisions apply
to policy reforms that belong to de￿ned classes of reforms ￿ policy areas. A leading
example of a policy area is a bill of rights, but many other examples could be given: the
Danish constitution, for example, has special rules for decisions related to expropriation
of property, while the German constitution speci￿es that some laws have to pass both
the Bundesrat and in the Bundestag, while others can pass with a simple majority in the
house alone.25 Insofar as a policy area provide some, albeit, imperfect information about
the potential costs associated with policy reforms in that area and reforms can reliably
be attributed to the relevant policy area as they come up, there is scope for designing
constitutions with policy area speci￿c decision rules. This, of course, is very diﬀerent from
writing a cost dependent constitution.26 The purpose of this section is to compare policy
area (PA) constitutions with MR constitutions in a situation where the cost of reform is
observed only ex post, i.e., after adaptation. We stress that it is costly, but not impossible,
to determine accurately to which policy area a particular policy belongs.27
25The argument developed in this section is similar to the theory of constitutional rights developed by
[17] and [18]. He makes the point that individuals, from behind the veil of ignorance, would want to apply
stricter rules to policy decisions that entail particularly high costs than to other decisions.
26While a CD constitution says ￿if the cost to losers of policy A is low, then use majority rule m while
if the cost is high, use majority rule n,￿ a PA constitution may, for example, say ￿if policy A is about
education, then use majority rule m whereas if it is about civil liberties, then use majority rule n￿.
27Policy areas can, in principle, be combined with the constitutional mechanisms considered in the
previous sections. That is, policy areas can play a role also in situations where the costs can be observed,
but not veri￿ed, before the policy decision is made. We do not consider this in detail but stress that real
world constitutions typically contain a mixture of the various constitutions that we analyze. From an
analytic point of view, it is, however, instructive to separate the diﬀerent aspects out.
235.1. The set-up and timing of events
We assume that every policy reform A belongs to one of two policy areas, denoted φ ∈
{φ1,φ 2}. Each policy area is associated with a particular probability distribution of the
costs of reform with
ρj =P r
¡
c = c|φ = φj
¢
.
The two policy areas are cost informative if ρ1 6= ρ2 and are cost equivalent otherwise. We
assume that ρ1 ≥ ρ2, that is, policy area φ1 is more likely to be associated with low cost
reforms than policy area φ2, but allow for cost equivalence. The unconditional probability
that a policy reform belongs to area φ1 is q. Accordingly, the probability that c = c obtains
is
Pr(c = c)=qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2 = η,
and Pr(c = c)=1− η. We can summarize the timing of events as follows:
1. From behind the veil of ignorance, a representative individual (the constitutional
designer) designs a constitution.
2. Nature selects p which is not observed. Given p, individuals are partitioned in the
two sets W and WC by Nature. Individuals know to which set they belong, but this
information is not veri￿able.
3. Nature selects the policy area, φ. This can only be observed (and veri￿ed) by incur-
ring the deadweight cost τ>0 (as described in stage 3c).
3a. Nature selects with equal probability a representative for the winners or the losers.
This representative, indexed by j, makes an announcement about the policy area
b aj ∈ {φ1,φ 2}.
3b. Upon observing b aj, a representative for the other side, indexed by k, makes an
announcement about the policy area b ak ∈ {φ1,φ 2}.
3c. If b aj 6= b ak, the dispute is taken to the courts who insure that the policy decision
is allocated to the correct policy area and all citizens incur the cost τ>0.I f t h e
two announcements coincide, the common recommendation determines which policy
area the policy reform is allocated to and nobody pays the cost.
4. Individuals vote for or against policy A. The vote result is observed by everyone.
5. The policy outcome is determined according to the constitutional rules laid down in
1.
246. Given φ,n a t u r es e l e c t sc and payoﬀs are realized.
This time line embodies two new features. First, the cost is not known until after the
policy reform is adopted.28 Second, the announcement stage, 3a-3c, is meant to capture
the idea that it requires (costly) legal expertise or, as a minimum, time and eﬀort from
individuals to allocate reforms to the correct policy area. We denote this cost by τ>0.
The cost is borne by all individuals. However, individuals can agree not to bother to ￿nd
out about what the policy area is and, thereby, avoid the cost τ.O f c o u r s e , b y d o i n g
so, they cannot be sure that decisions are made with the intended rules which in itself is
undesirable. To capture this in a simple way, we allow representatives of the winners and
losers to make announcements about the policy areas.29 Since they do not know what the
correct policy area is, these announcements have no informational content as such, and
serve the sole purpose of allowing individuals to decide not to incur the cost of ￿nding out
about the correct policy area.30
5.2. Optimal Constitutions When C is Observed Ex Post
We can now de￿ne formally what we mean by policy area speci￿cm a j o r i t yr u l e s :
Deﬁnition 5 A Policy Areas (PA) constitution is a pair {m,n} of majority rules with









(p ≥ m) ∧
h‡




b φj 6= b φk
·
∧ (φ = φ1)
·i
(p ≥ n) ∧
h‡




b φj 6= b φk
·
∧ (φ = φ2)
·i
B otherwise
A PA constitution speci￿es two majority rules m and n ￿ one intended for each policy
area. The m-majority rule is applied if the two representatives agree that this rule should
28Notice that neither the welfare costs nor the policy area are known until after individuals learn
their status as winners or losers. This leaves room for renegotiation of the policy area speci￿cm a j o r i t y
rules speci￿ed in the original constitution after the veil of ignorance has been (partially) lifted in stage
2. The veil of ignorance construct, however, embodies the assumption that the original constitutional
rules can be enforced by the courts after the veil has been lifted, and we, thus, rule out the possibility
of renegotiation. It should, however, be noted that for certain speci￿cations of the bargaining game
describing the renegotiations (including generalized Nash Bargaining), our results would not be aﬀected
by allowing for renegotiation: the original constitutional designer would anticipate the outcome of the
bargaining game and factor that into the original rules (which determines the fall back payoﬀs) in such a
way as to implement the rules what would have been optimal without renegotiation.
29The presence of representatives that can make announcement on behalf of all winners or losers assumes
away potential coordination problems.
30The sequential structure of the announcements is not important. Similar results can be obtained with
simultaneous announcements. This is true because neither of the representatives knows the true policy
area when they make their announcements.
25be used or if, after a dispute, the court rules that the policy area is φ1. Similarly for n.W e
notice that the MR constitution is a special case of this with m = n. The next proposition
characterizes the optimal majority rules as a function of the cost of allocating decisions to
the correct policy area (τ).
Proposition 5 (PA constitutions) Let F be uniform on [0,1], ρ1 >ρ 2, 0 <q<1 and
∞ >z>y . Then there exists a critical level of the cost ∆ > 0 such that the optimal
PA constitution speci￿es policy area speci￿cr u l e s(m∗
PA,n ∗
PA) for τ ∈ [0,∆] but speci￿es





ρ1y +( 1− ρ1)z





ρ2y +( 1− ρ2)z





z − (qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2)(z − y)
w + z − (qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2)(z − y)
.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition shows that policy area speci￿c majority rules are optimal when the
cost of allocating decisions to the correct policy area is low (τ ≤ ∆). In this case, the two
representatives are willing to incur the cost τ. This insures that the intended rule is always
applied, and the constitutional designer can then tailor these to take into account policy
area speci￿c information about the distribution of the cost of reform. For τ>∆,t h e
situation is diﬀerent. The representatives could, in principle, agree not to ￿nd out about
the policy area (and avoid τ), but continue to apply policy area speci￿c rules modi￿ed to
take into account that decisions occasionally would be made using the ￿wrong￿ rule. The
proposition shows that this is never optimal: for τ>∆,i ti sb e t t e rt ou s eo n er u l ef o ra l l
decisions and that rule is eﬀectively the one associated with the optimal MR constitution
(compare to proposition 2).
The policy area speci￿c majority rule for policy area 1 (m∗
PA) is more lenient than that
for policy area 2 (n∗
PA). Intuitively, this is because it is more likely that losers incur the
high cost z for policy reforms in this area than for reforms in the other area. However,
if the two policy areas are cost equivalent, then the same majority rule applies to both
areas, even if τ =0< ∆. Thus, a necessary condition for policy area speci￿cm a j o r i t y
rules is that policy areas are, in fact, cost informative and for τ ≤ ∆, this is also suﬃcient.
We can, however, say more than that by studying ∆ for a given τ. The critical value ∆ is
de￿ned by the diﬀerence in expected utility between a constitution that uses the optimal
policy area speci￿cr u l e s(m∗
PA,n ∗
PA) conditional on decisions being allocated correctly and
a constitution that applies the best single rule m∗
MR to all decisions and is, thus, a function
of z and ρ1.
26Proposition 6 (Costs) Let F be uniform on [0,1], ρ1 >ρ 2, 0 <q<1 and τ ∈ (0,τz).31
Then there exist two critical values of z such that
1. Policy area speci￿cr u l e s(m∗
PA,n ∗
PA) are optimal for z ∈ [z1,z 2].
2. A single rule m∗
MR is optimal for z ∈ (y,z1) or z ∈ (z2,∞).
Corollary 1 (Bill of Rights). Let ρ1 =1and τ>0. Then policy area speci￿cr u l e s
(m∗
PA,n ∗
PA) are optimal for all z ≥ z3 >y .
Proof. See Appendix
The proposition shows how the constitutional choice of rules depends on the size of the
potential cost z for a given τ.F o rl o wz,t h eo p t i m a lc h o i c ei st ou s eas i n g l er u l e .T h i s
is because the potential welfare consequences of diﬀerent reforms are very similar (z close
to y), and, as a consequence, it does not pay to incur the cost of separating the decisions
along the lines of policy areas. More surprisingly, perhaps, the single rule is also optimal
for extremely high costs. To see why notice from proposition 5 that it is almost impossible
t op a s sa n yp o l i c yw h e nz is large, independently of whether one or two rules are used.
Accordingly, since most decisions are blocked in any case, it does not pay to incur the
cost of separating decisions according to policy areas. The implication, then, is that policy
area speci￿c rules dominate a single rule for intermediate costs. In these cases, the optimal
policy area speci￿cr u l e sa r es u ﬃciently diﬀerent and the expected welfare gain of using a
tougher rule for reforms in area 2 is suﬃcient to compensate for the cost τ.
More interestingly, perhaps, the corollary provides a rational for including a Bill of
Rights in the constitution. Eﬀectively a Bill of Rights separates out policy reforms that
by infringing with fundamental rights often generate disproportionately large losses from
those reforms that do not. Interpreting policy area 2 as the Bill of Rights and area 1 as
all other decisions that never generates the high cost z (ρ1 =1 ) ,w es e et h a ti ti so p t i m a l
to include such a Bill if the potential cost associated with an infringement of these rights
is suﬃciently large.32 In particular, if z is extremely large or if it is very likely that any
change in the speci￿ed rights will generate the loss z, then the constitution would never
allow reforms in this area, i.e., n∗
PA ’ 1. This is, in fact, what many constitutions do: they
single out a limited set of basic rights that cannot be violated by any policy reform.33
31τz is de￿ned in the Appendix.
32Notice that with ρ1 =1 , m∗
PA is independent of z and so the diﬀerence between n∗
PAand m∗
PA widens,
rather than narrows, as z increases.
33Examples of this include Article 6 of the Dutch constitution of 1983 and Chapter 1 of the German
constitution of 1995.
27Proposition 7 (Cost informativeness) Let F be uniform on [0,1], ∞ >z>yand τ ∈
(0,τρ1).34 Then there exists a critical value ρ1 ∈ (ρ2,1) such that for ρ1 ≥ ρ1, policy
area speci￿cr u l e s(m∗
PA,n ∗




Proposition 7 shows that policy area speci￿cr u l e sd o m i n a t et h es i n g l er u l ew h e np o l i c y
areas are suﬃciently cost informative (ρ1 > ρ1). The intuition is simple. As cost infor-
mativeness increases, the bene￿t of using policy area speci￿c rules increases because the
rules can be better tailored to the distribution of costs associated with each area. In turn,
individuals are willing to incur larger costs to get decisions allocated to the correct policy
area. Putting this together with the observation that policy area speci￿c rules are likely
to be better than a single rule for low τ, an interesting interaction eﬀect may arise. If two
policy areas are easily distinguishable, then it is reasonable to suppose that they are also
cost informative. This makes it likely that τ is low and (ρ1 − ρ2) is high at the same time.
For actual constitutions, then, our analysis suggests that special rules will mostly
be used for policies that have to do with civil liberties, property rights, procedures for
declaring war, procedures for signing international treaties, or the nomination/election of
important institutions. These are easily distinguishable from all other policies. This is not
only because it is easy to establish whether policies belong to these areas, but also because
these policies are likely to be associated with substantially diﬀerent cost distributions than
other areas.
6. Constitutional Change
All the constitutions that we analyzed above share the common feature that no constitu-
tional change is allowed. Some of the possibilities we have considered allow for diﬀerent
rules to be used depending on the circumstances, but these rules are all determined behind
the veil of ignorance. In this section, we study constitutional change, by looking at consti-
tutions that allow the rules to be modi￿ed depending on the circumstances after the veil
of ignorance has been lifted, but where the new rules are not part of the original consti-
tution. We show that amendment rules ￿ meta-rules that allow individuals to change the
original constitutional rules ￿ emerge as an optimal response to the possibility of a consti-
tutional crisis, but only if it is suﬃciently likely that a crisis will occur. We introduce the
possibility of a crisis to capture the notion that the relative political strength of diﬀerent
groups depends on other factors than group size (as captured by p). For example, it may
34τρ1 is de￿ned in the Appendix.
28be the case that the winners have the numbers to enact a certain policy program, but that
the losers have particularly strong interest groups or even a credible threat of recourse to
violence that allow them to threaten a crisis if winners go ahead. Clearly, such threats are
not always present and even when they are, loser may not be successful in carrying the
threat through.
We assume that c can be veri￿ed. This is a very strong assumption, of course, but it
allows us to focus on the question of constitutional amendments in isolation from the issues
discussed in section 4. We model the constitutional crisis as follows. After the original
constitution has been designed, but before policies are implemented, the conditions for a
crises are determined, which are either favorable or unfavorable. If the state is ω,t h e n
conditions are unfavorable and a crisis is impossible. If, on the other hand, the state is
ω, then conditions are favorable and a crisis may occur. The probability that conditions
are favorable is γ =P r ( ω = ω). A crisis occurs if the constitution allows policies with
c = c to pass with positive probability. The interpretation is that when ω = ω,l o s e r s
are in a position to generate a crisis, but will only do so if reforms with high costs can
be implemented through the constitution. The fact that a crisis occurs does, however,
not imply that it is successful: we assume that it is successful only with probability
1 − α. If it is successful, then B obtains regardless of the constitutional rules.35 If a
crisis is not successful, which happens with probability α, the policy outcome is decided
by the constitutional rules in place at the time.36 We can summarize this by the following
(modi￿ed) time line:
1. From behind the veil of ignorance, a representative individual (the constitutional
designer) designs a constitution.
2. Nature selects p. p is not observed by individuals.
3. Given p, individuals are partitioned in the two sets W and WC by Nature. Individ-
uals know to which set they belong, but this information is not veri￿able. Nature
selects ω. The realization of ω is observed by everyone.
4. If ω = ω and the constitution allows policy A to pass with some probability when
c = c, a constitutional crisis occurs and is successful with probability 1 − α.I f i t
is successful, then all individuals get zero utility and the process ends. If it is not
successful or if ω = ω,t h e ns t a g e5 applies.
5. Nature selects c which is observed by everyone and is veri￿able.
35This insures that there is no scope for renegotiation after a successful crisis.
36I nt h em o d e l ,w ea s s u m et h a tp and ω are drawn independently by nature. In reality, p and ω may
be negatively correlated because sheers numbers are important in democracies. Modelling this would
complicate our model excessively but would not change our results in a signi￿cant way.
296. Individuals vote for or against A.T h er e s u l to ft h ev o t ei so b s e r v e db ye v e r y o n ea n d
is veri￿able.
7. The policy outcome is determined according to the constitution in place at the time.
It is important that c, which controls the consequences of policy A,i so b s e r v e da f t e r
amendments to the constitution have been made and after any crisis has been resolved.
One can think of policies A and B as bundles of decisions ￿ policy programs ￿ which diﬀer in
their cost to losers (depending on c), but generate the same set of winners and losers. The
assumption that the value c is not revealed until after winners and losers (W and WC)h a v e
been identi￿ed can then be interpreted as saying that the exact details of these programs
are unknown at the time when individuals learn whether a change to the status quo will
increase or decrease their welfare. In other words, what matters in determining whether
a crisis occurs or not, is not whether losers suﬀer losses z, but whether the constitution
allows such losses to occur.37
The key assumption, however, is that ω cannot be veri￿ed. While the factors (other
than group size) that determine the actual strength of each group and their ability to
generate a crisis may be easy to recognize ex post, they cannot easily be described ex ante
and for that reason they cannot be part of the constitution. This is what leaves room for
amendment rules that allow individuals to respond to circumstances as they arise. Before
we demonstrate this point formally, it is useful to analyze the benchmark in which ω can,
in fact, be veri￿ed. Throughout, we assume that F is uniform.38
6.1. Optimal Constitutions when ω is Veriﬁable
We begin by studying the case in which both ω and c can be veri￿ed. This allows us
to characterize the ￿rst-best constitution. This obviously makes amendment procedures
irrelevant, but it provides an useful benchmark. We refer to the ￿rst-best constitution
with veri￿able ω as the VFB constitution.
W h e nac r i s i si sn o tp o s s i b l e( ω = ω), the constitutional problem is identical to the










37As in section 5, the fact that c is unknown by the time winners and losers are determined leaves scope
for renegotiation of the majority rules. We maintain the assumption that the courts will always be able
to enforce the rules agreed upon behind the veil of ignorance. Note that this is a realistic assumption:
in practice, renegotiating constitutional rules whenever a new policy decision has to be made would be
impractical.
38The assumption that F is uniform can easily be relaxed.




EU (m,1) if n =1
αEU (m,n) if n < 1
.
By blocking all reforms with high costs (n =1 ), all crisis can be prevented and EU(m,1)
is guaranteed. Alternatively, reforms with high costs may be allowed to pass with a n-
majority leaving open the possibility that a crisis may occur and be successful. Thus,
EU(m,n) is obtained with probability α only. The next proposition follows immediately
from these observations and is presented without proof.
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if (ω = ω) ∧ (α<α 0)
where
α0 =
η (w + z)
η (w + z)+( w + y)(1− η)
< 1
is the ￿rst-best constitution.
To achieve ￿rst-best, the constitutional designer needs to tailor the rules to diﬀerent
realizations of ω (and c). The cut-oﬀ value, α0, indicates the point at which, conditional
on a crisis being possible (ω obtaining), it is optimal for the constitutional designer to
adopt a constitution that prevents all crises from happing (n =1 ) rather than one that
allows crises to happen (n = z
w+z). We note, therefore, that if it is suﬃciently unlikely that
a crisis will ever be successful (α is high), it is better to allow for the occasional crisis than
to prevent all crises from happening at the cost of blocking policy reforms that potentially
bene￿t a large number of people.
6.2. Optimal Constitutions when ω is Not Veriﬁable
In general, it is not possible to verify if the conditions for a crisis are favorable or not and
it is, therefore, impossible to make the constitutions directly contingent on ω. However,
since individuals do observe what the conditions are, the constitution can, in principle,
make use of announcements made by members of society about ω a n dd e s i g nt h em a j o r i t y
rules accordingly. To study this possibility, we allow representatives for the winners and
losers to make costless announcements about what the conditions for a crisis are. These
announcements are common knowledge. Formally, we add two new stages (3i and 3ii) to
the time line after stage 3:
313i Nature selects with equal probability one of the two representatives j to make the
announcement b ωj ∈ {ω,ω}.
3ii Upon observing b ωj, the other representative k makes the announcement b ωk ∈ {ω,ω}.
Given these announcements, we can de￿ne a constitution with announcements (AFB)
as a pair of announcement-speci￿cm a j o r i t yr u l e s(m,n)(b ω) where m is used for reforms
with low costs c and n is used for reforms with high costs c and b ω =( b ωj, b ωk).T h e
diﬀerence between this and the VFB constitution, of course, is the dependency on the
announced rather than the actual value of ω. The next proposition characterizes the
optimal announcement constitution:
Proposition 9 Suppose that ω is not veri￿able. The optimal announcement constitution
is:




























































α0 − (1 − γ)
γ
<α 0.
Proof. See Appendix ¤
The proposition shows that the majority rules used by the optimal announcement con-
stitution depend critically on the probability of a successful crisis, 1 − α.F i r s t ,w h e n e v e r
α ≥ α0, a crisis is not very likely to be successful, and it never optimal to prevent it from






no matter what the announce-
m e n t sa r e ,a si nt h e￿rst-best. Second, when α<α 2, a crisis is likely to be successful.
The two representatives have opposite interests: the representative for the winners will
always claim that conditions are favorable for a crisis (to get reforms blocked), while the
representative for the losers will claim the opposite, no matter what the true conditions
are. Thus, the announcements are not informative and the majority rules cannot be made




EU (m,1) if n =1
(γα+( 1− γ))EU (m,n) if n < 1
This problem is similar to the one studied in section 6.1, except that the probability of
avoiding a crisis when reforms with high costs are allowed to pass (n<1)i s(γα+( 1− γ))





otherwise. We notice that the critical value α1 is lower than α0 ￿ the critical
value applicable when ω is veri￿able. This is because the constitution cannot distinguish
between favorable and unfavorable conditions for a crisis and so, if it blocks reforms with
high costs, it does so, not only when a crisis is possible, as in the ￿rst-best, but also when
a crisis is not possible. As a consequence, the constitutional designer is willing to run the
risk of a crisis for lower values of α than in the ￿rst-best.
Third, the most interesting case is when α ∈ (α2,α 0). In this case, it is possible to elicit
the information about the conditions for a crisis truthfully and, thus, to use the ￿rst-best
majority rules. The point is that both representatives agree that blocking all reforms with
high costs (n =1 ) is optimal when conditions for a crisis are favorable (ω), but disagree
when conditions are not favorable. Thus, by using the majority rule n =1if and only
if the two representatives announce the same thing, the announcement constitution can
mimic the VFB constitution. The reasons why the two representatives agree about the
optimal rule when conditions for a crisis are favorable are, however, very diﬀerent. The
winners want n =1because, from their point of view, it is too likely that a crisis will be
successful. By setting n =1and preventing a crisis for sure, reforms with low costs are
allowed to pass with a m-majority and that is better than running the risk of not getting
w at all. The losers, on the other hand, want n =1because, from their point of view,
a crisis (which blocks all reforms) is not suﬃciently likely to succeed, and it is better to
insure that at least reforms with high costs are never adopted.
6.3. Optimal Constitutions with Amendment Rules
Another way to deal with the fact that the conditions for a crisis cannot be veri￿ed is to
grant individuals the right to amend the original constitution provided that a suﬃciently
large majority ￿ de￿ned in the amendment rule of the original constitution ￿ is in favor
33of an amendment. This is very diﬀerent from the announcement constitution. In that
constitution (and in all the other ones we have considered so far) the majority rules are
determined from behind the veil of ignorance; that is, all rules are part of the original
constitution. In contrast, amendment rules are meta-rule that de￿ne the circumstances
under which a new set of majority rules (a new constitution) can be adopted after the veil
of ignorance has been lifted. This allows individuals to respond to circumstances as they
arise by change the rules that govern policy making.
To model the idea of constitutional amendment, we need to specify the details of the
amendment procedure. Amendments take place after stage 3 in the time line as follows:
3I. Nature selects one of the representatives j to propose a new constitution, denoted
by {mj (c),nj (c),r j} where mj (c) and nj (c) are the majority rules that apply to
c and c respectively and rj is an amendment rule. After that, k proposes another
constitution {mk (c),nk (c),r k}.
3II. Individuals vote sequentially for or against the proposed constitutional changes. Let
{m,n,r} be the original constitution and let vj be the votes in favor of the new
constitution proposed by representative j.I fvj ≥ r,t h e n{mj (c),nj (c),r j} replaces
the current constitution.
3III. If vj ≥ r and vk ≥ rj then {mk (c),nk (c),r k} replaces {mj (c),nj (c),r j} while if
vj <rand vk ≥ r then {mk (c),nk (c),r k} replaces {m,n,r}.39
We can now de￿ned what an amendable (AM) constitution is.
Deﬁnition 6 An Amendable (AM) constitution is a triplet {m,n,r} with cost dependent
majority rules m ∈ [0,1] and n ∈ [0,1], and an amendment rule r ∈ [0,1] such that if for
any l ∈ {j,k}, vl ≥ r, then the original constitution {m,n,r} is replaced by {ml,nl,r l}
and no replacement otherwise.
This de￿nition highlights two important points. First, an amendable constitution is
not a ω-dependent mechanism as the original constitution {m,n,r} does not depend on
ω. This is crucial because an AM constitution is, in general, not outcome-equivalent to
an announcement constitution. This provides a normative justi￿cation for amendment
rules provided that the optimal AM constitution yields higher expected utility than the
optimal constitution with announcements characterized in proposition 9. Second, the AM
39If no-one proposes an alternative to the original constitution, or if the proposals are all identical to
the current constitution, then, trivially, the constitution is unchanged and steps 3II and 3III do not apply.
34constitution takes the notion of constitutional amendment seriously in the sense that the
amendment rules do not have direct policy implications but only through a change in
the constitutional rules. In other words, r determines whether {m,n} or {ml,nl} apply,
not whether x = A or x = B. This is precisely why announcements and amendable
constitutions can generate diﬀerent outcomes.40















and is it outcome-equivalent to a VFB constitution with
(m,n)(ω)=

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if (ω = ω) ∧ (α<η )
Proof. See Appendix ¤
It is easy to give an intuition for this result. Given that the realization ω has nothing to
do with c,i ti so p t i m a lt os e tm =
y
y+w just as we would have done had ω been veri￿able.
More interestingly, setting r = z
z+w and n =1guarantees that if ω = ω, a policy with c
will obtain if and only if p ≥ z
z+w just as it would have done with a VFB constitution.
This is because amendments are possible if and only if p ≥ r = z
z+w and given that the
constitutional amendment passes, it is then optimal to set m =
y
y+w and to pick a n ≤ z
z+w.
The diﬀerence between the VFB constitution and the AM constitution arises when
ω = ω. In this case, the change from n =1to some value n ≤ z
z+w can occur at lower
values of α because individuals who know they are winners trade-oﬀ majority rules and
the probability of a crisis diﬀerently from individuals behind the veil of ignorance. In
particular, winners have more to lose from a majority rule that makes high costs to losers
impossible than an individual behind the veil of ignorance who might actually turn out to
be a loser.
The fact that optimal AM constitution is outcome-equivalent to a sub-optimal VFB
constitution allows us to compare optimal AM and announcement constitutions against
the optimal VFB constitution. Note that α2 <η<α 0.
40We assume w<z . This guarantees that winners and losers cannot both satisfy the amendment rule
by themselves.
351. For α<ηthe optimal AM constitution is equivalent to the optimal VFB constitution.
2. For α ∈ (α2,α 0) the optimal announcement constitution is equivalent to the optimal
VFB constitution. In particular, since α2 <η , the announcement constitution is the
only constitution equivalent to the optimal VFB constitution in the interval [η,α0).
3. For α ≥ α0 both the optimal AM and the announcement constitution are equivalent
to the optimal VFB constitution.
Proof. Follows immediately from the analysis above ¤
The constitutional designer faces a choice between a ￿exible and a rigid constitution.
The AM constitution is ￿exible because it allows the majority rules to be tailored to
the realization of ω, but because this occurs only after the veil of ignorance is removed,
it cannot be done with the impartiality that the veil of ignorance provides: the new
constitution favors some individuals.41 For small values of α, i.e. for any α<ηthe
risk of a successful crisis is so high that winners can be trusted to make the right choice
despite their impartiality. Thus, the optimal AM constitution fully replicates the VFB
constitution and performs as if ω was veri￿able.
The announcement constitution, on the other hand, is rigid in the sense that the major-
ity rules are chosen from amongst a pre-determined set of rules. Nonetheless, it preforms
better than the ￿exible AM constitution whenever the possibility of a successful crisis is
neither too high nor too low (α ∈ [η,α0)). The reason for this is that the announcement
constitution can for probabilities of a successful crisis in this range elicit the true condi-
tions of a crisis. Thus, a rigid constitution is the preferred mechanism for some cases in
which the threat of a successful crisis is neither too high nor too low.
The above gives us interesting predictions regarding the degree of ￿exibility and rigidity
in constitutions. The main message is that the greater ￿exibility associated with consti-
tutional amendment should be associated with cases in which the stability of the political
system is in more danger. With regard to AFB constitutions, note that the announce-
ment phase in these constitutions is very similar to many of the procedures that actual
constitutions use to declare states of emergency which often require diﬀerent powers (e.g.
executive and legislative) to agree.42 Our results suggest that such mechanisms are par-
ticularly suited to situations when the risk to the stability of the political system are not
too high.
41Notice that the majority rules of the VFB constitution depend on the realization of ω but how is
determined already behind the veil of ignorance, Therefore, the VFB constitution provides ￿exibility and
impartiality at the same time.
42[22], pages 143-144, argue that in most presidential systems, presidents have the power to declare that
a state of emergency exists. However, it is interesting to note that with few exceptions (e.g. France) these
power have to be exercised in agreement with the legislative branch.
367. Checks and Balances
A recent literature in political economics has emphasized on checks and balances as an
instrument to reduce agency problems between politicians and citizens (see e.g., [20] for
a fundamental contribution in this regard). While it is clear that checks and balances do
play an important role in this regard, it is not the only role that they play. We argue
that checks and balances can also serve to provide protection to identi￿able groups of
citizens by granting them a veto on decisions that are important to them. The leading
example of this is a federation where some policy reforms must be approved by voters in
each region separately to pass. In Belgium, for example, the constitution explicitly de￿nes
both linguistic communities and geographical regions which are granted speci￿cr i g h t s .I n
particular, Articles 4 and 5 among other things state that federal executive power can
only be imposed on a territory if it is approved by a separate majority vote in each of the
four linguistic regions of the country. The European Union is another example of a polity
where many key decisions require separate approval by each member state to pass.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that checks and balances, understood as
separate decision rules for speci￿c sub-groups of society, can be optimal. However, we also
stress that there are costs as well as bene￿ts associated with their introduction. Thus,
w ew i l ls h o wt h em e r ef a c tt h a ts p e c i ￿c (linguistic or ethnic) groups can be identi￿ed and
group membership can be veri￿ed is not suﬃcient to call for checks and balances.
7.1. The Setup
We assume that the population is partitioned into to disjoint groups, h ∈ {S,T} according
to some readily observable and veri￿able characteristics. For example, group aﬃliation
can be determined by geography or ethnicity. At the constitutional stage, individuals do
not yet know their group aﬃliation, only that they face an equal chance of belonging to
either group.43 Group aﬃliation matters because of diﬀerences in the potential loss under
policy A. We assume that zT >z S and thus that individuals belonging to group T are
more exposed to loses than individuals belonging to group S.44 The fraction of individuals
in group h that gains from policy A (the winners in group h) is denoted ph,w h e r epS
and pT are drawn independently from the same cumulative distribution F(p).T oo b t a i n
closed form solutions, we assume that F(p) follows a uniform distribution on [0,1].W e
focus on the case where the costs are observe ex post and allow for two policy areas, as
in section 5. For simplicity, we assume that reforms can be allocated at zero cost to the
43The assumption that an individual from behind the veil of ignorance believes that he or she is as likely
to belong to one group as to the other can be relaxed and would not change the results substantially.
44This is just one dimension in which groups might diﬀer. An alternative is to assume that the likelihood
of losing under policy A diﬀers between groups. We conjecture that this would lead to results very similar
to those presented in the text.
37correct policy area and that ρ1 >ρ 2. Thus, all the constitutions we consider below will
be based on policy area speci￿c rules of one sort or the other and we can without loss of
generality ignore the announce stage (3a-3c). We can summarize the timing of events by
the following time line:
1. From behind the veil of ignorance, a representative individual (the constitutional
designer) designs a constitution.
2. Nature determines group aﬃliation. This is done by making a sequence of indepen-
dent draws from a Bernoulli distribution with Pr(h = S)=1
2. This is observable by
everyone and is veri￿able.
3. Nature selects ph and φ. The realization of φ can be observed (and veri￿ed) at zero
cost.
4. Given ph, individuals in group h ∈ {S,T} are partitioned into the two sets W and
W C by Nature.
5. Individuals vote for or against policy A. The vote result is observed by everyone.
6. The policy outcome is determined according to the constitutional rules laid down in
1.
7. Given φ, c is determined.
7.2. Optimal Constitutions
Can checks and balances be optimal? By checks and balances we mean a situation in
which diﬀerent decision rules apply to diﬀerent groups and that policy A must therefore
pass separate tests in the two groups to be adopted. In a sense, checks and balances give
each group the right to veto a reform, but only if a suﬃciently large number of individuals
in the group supports the veto. In contrast, in the absence of checks and balances, policy
A passes if it has suﬃcient support in the entire population, and consequently support
from one group can compensate for opposition from the other: support is transferable.
Formally, we can de￿ne a Constitution with No Checks and Balances (NCB) is de￿ned
as follows:
Deﬁnition 7 A NCB constitution is a pair {m,n} with m ∈ [0,1] and n ∈ [0,1] such that
x =
‰
Ai f[pS + pT ≥ 2m ∨ φ = φ1] ∧ [pS + pT ≥ 2n ∨ φ = φ2]
B otherwise
38This constitution requires that a m-majority be formed from either of the two groups
to support a reform in policy area 1 for it to pass and similarly for reforms in policy area
2. In contrast, a Constitution With Checks and Balances (CB) requires that policy A
obtains a majority separately in each of the two groups. Formally,





Ai f(pS ≥ mS ∨ pT ≥ mT ∨ φ = φ1) ∧ (pS ≥ nS ∨ pT ≥ nT ∨ φ = φ2)
B otherwise .
Thus, with checks and balances, a reform in policy area 1 passes only if a mS-majority
of group S and a mT-majority of group T support it, and similarly for policies in area
2. Combinations of the two constitutions are, of course, possible and we can de￿ne a
Constitution with Partial Checks and Balances (PCB) as follows:





Ai f(pS + pT ≥ 2m ∨ φ = φ1) ∧ (pS ≥ nS ∨ pT ≥ nT ∨ φ = φ2)
B otherwise




Ai f(pS ≥ mS ∨ pT ≥ mT ∨ φ = φ1) ∧ (pS + pT ≥ 2n ∨ φ = φ2)
B otherwise
For each of these constitutions, the constitutional designer selects the majority rules
that maximizes expected utility from behind the veil of ignorance.45 For the NCB consti-




(1 − ρ1)zE + ρ1w





(1 − ρ2)zE + ρ2w








(1 − ρ1)zh + ρ1w − w
3
(1 − ρ1)zh +( 1+ρ1)w
(7.3)




(1 − ρ2)zh + ρ2w − w
3
(1 − ρ2)zh +( 1+ρ2)w
(7.4)
for h ∈ {S,T}. As we would expect, the rules associated with policy area 2 are stricter
than those associated with area 1 in both cases, and under the CB constitution, group T,
which has most to loss from policy A, are assigned stricter rules than group S with less
to lose. The PCB constitution with checks and balance for one policy area only uses a
combination of these rules: the NCB rules for the policy area without checks and balances
and the CB rules for the area with checks and balances.
We can characterize the optimal constitutional choice:
Proposition 11 Assume ρ1 >ρ 2, w = y and zT >z S. The optimal constitution is
1. For zT ∈ [zS,zT), the NCB constitution is optimal;
2. For zT ∈ [zT,b zT), the PCB constitution with checks and balances for policy area 2
is optimal;
3. for zT ≥ b zT, the CB constitution is optimal;
where
zT =








The proposition shows that it is optimal to use checks and balances when the two
groups are suﬃciently diﬀerent: for small cost diﬀerences, the NCB constitution continues
to be optimal. For intermediate cost diﬀerences, it is optimal to use a constitution with a
universal rule for decisions in policy area 1, but group-speci￿c rules for decisions in policy
area 2, i.e., to give the two groups a veto over policies in area 2. For large cost diﬀerences,
it is optimal to use group-speci￿c rules for all policy areas.
What is the intuition behind these results? The advantage of having checks and bal-
ances is that policy reforms cannot pass without suﬃcient support from all groups. In
contrast, the advantage of universal rules is that they allow support from one group to
compensate for opposition from the other, thereby allowing policy reforms to pass if most
individuals in society at large, are in favor. Thus, the constitutional designer faces a trade
oﬀ between giving veto rights to each group and making political support transferable.
How this trade-oﬀ is resolved depends on the cost diﬀerence zT −zS.I ft h ec o s td i ﬀerence
is large, the constitutional designer knows that if she keeps universal rules she takes on
40a large risk. If once the veil of ignorance is lifted, c = c, and she is a loser in group T,
policy A will pass too easily. On the other hand, if the cost diﬀerence is small, then it
is desirable to avoid checks and balances and allow support to be transferable: the cost
of allowing group T to block policy A is too large in the case where the constitutional
designer belongs to the low cost group (group S). Since we assume that policies in policy
area 2 are more likely to generate large losses, it is clear that it is, ceteris paribus,m o r e
bene￿cial to have checks and balances for this policy area than for policy area 1.T h i s
explains the intermediate regime with partial checks and balances: checks and balances
are introduced only for policy areas for which it is likely that losses are large.
We have argued that policy reforms sometimes have very diﬀerent consequences for
diﬀerent groups of citizens and shown that this line of reasoning provides an alternative
rationale for having checks and balances in constitutions. Our analysis shows that societies
might allow speci￿c groups to hold a veto over policy reforms in some or in all policy
areas. Put diﬀerently, optimal constitutions may require that policy reforms have suﬃcient
support among all (relevant) groups in society. Checks and balances are optimal from the
original position when group aﬃliation matters suﬃciently. We focus on cost diﬀerences,
but similar results can be derived when heterogeneity arises from the fact that individuals
in one group are more likely to lose from reforms than individuals in other groups. An
implication, then, is that checks and balance are of greater value in heterogeneous societies
and may, in fact, be instrumental in preventing such societies from splitting up into smaller
units.
Although we focus on the case where group aﬃliation is unknown at the constitutional
stage (which allows us to use the veil of ignorance device to analyze the constitutional
choice), our framework can be of guidance in thinking about the more common situation
where group aﬃliation is known already at the constitutional stage but checks and balances
might be necessary to ensure some group￿s participation. In the European Union, for
example, a fundamental question is if member countries should be allowed to veto certain
decisions or if decisions should be made by majority voting. Our results suggest that it is
optimal to allow such vetoes for policy areas where national interests diﬀer suﬃciently (e.g.
foreign policy and defense), but not for areas where costs and bene￿ts are more evenly
distributed across countries (e.g., immigration policy) just as is the case in the draft EU
constitution.
It is clear that checks and balances of the kind considered above can only be introduced
in situations where it is possible to identify and verify group aﬃliation at low cost. This
raise the broader question of why checks and balances are not used more widely, e.g.,
why do modern constitutions not make a distinction between males and females and allow
gender groups to have veto on speci￿c decisions? Our model suggests that this may be due
to the fact that for most policy areas men and women face a very similar distribution of
41costs and bene￿ts, but it would be interesting to explore other reasons in future research.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a framework for analyzing optimal constitutional design
from a normative perspective. Contrary to much of the recent literature on the issue, we
do not focus on exogenously given constitutional mechanisms (e.g. majority rules) and
studied how they change with changes in speci￿c parameters in the environment. Instead,
we study what constitutional mechanisms are optimal responses to the particular features
of the environment.
The collective decision problem we have described in this paper is extremely simple.
As mentioned above, the most obvious omissions is that we do not look at the agency
issues involved in the relationship between citizens and politicians and we do not have an
endogenous mechanism for developing policy proposal. A natural next step would then be
to incorporate some of these features in a more sophisticated framework to see how the
optimal constitutions would evolve in response to these features46.
A second interesting area for future research would be an analysis of the issues from a
positive perspective. As mentioned in the introduction this is not a simple task because
there is always a danger that the results are not robust to the details of the constitu-
tional bargaining game. Nevertheless, this is a necessary step if we wish to improve our
understanding of the foundations of democracies.
46[2] take a ￿rst step in this direction by making the policy maker a politician who also cares about
private bene￿ts and can choose policies that provide him with private bene￿ts. The optimal majority
rules thus responds to the politician￿s incentives.
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44Appendix A: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
The constitutional designer selects rules m ∈ [0,1], n ∈ [0,1] and λ ≥ 0 to maximize
expected utility from behind the veil of ignorance, taking into account that cost dependent
rules require that the cost realization is truthfully revealed in stage 4. Stage 4 describes a
game between the two representatives. They simultaneously decides how large a cost they
are willing to bear to change the default rule (m)t ot h ea l t e r n a t i v er u l e( n), that is, their
strategies are σj ∈ R+ and σk ∈ R+.
Suppose, ￿rst, that the constitution speci￿es m, n and λ ≥ 0 with n ≥ m.I t i s a
dominant strategy for the representative for the winners to play σj =0 . Consider the
representative for the loser. We want to identify the values of λ that makes it a dominant
strategy for the representative to play σk = λ if and only if c = c.L e t
µ(c,p)=P r( x = A|c,p)
be the probability that policy A is chosen as a function of c and p. Then, σk = λ if and
only if c = c requires the following incentive compatibility constraints to be satis￿ed:
Z 1
0














y[µ(c,p) − µ(c,p)]dF (p)
Note that we must require that µ(c,p) >µ (c,p) because the switching cost must be




(p(w + y) − y)µ(c,p)dF (p)+( 1− η)
Z 1
0














0 (1 − p)dF (p)=1− ψ. This expression can be rearrange to obtain
Z 1
0




µ(c,p)[(1− η)(p(w + z) − z +( 1− ψ)y)]dF(p)
45We see that this expression is maximized whenever
µ(c,p)=
(















(1 − ψ)y(w + z)
(z − y)((1 − ψ)y + w)
,
Then, for η>η ∗, the constitution with m =
y−ψ(1−η)y
η(w+y) ≥ n =
z−y(1−ψ)









implements this. For η<η ∗, this constitution is not feasi-
ble because λ would have to be negative. Given that, it is optimal to set λ =0and use
one common rule equal to m∗
MR.
Suppose, next, that the constitution speci￿es m, n and λ ≥ 0 with n<m .I t i s a
dominant strategy for the representative for the losers to play σk =0 . Since the winners
get w independent of c if policy A passes, there exists one and only one value of λ that




w[µ(c,p) − µ(c,p)]dF (p).
As a consequence, no matter how we break this indiﬀerence (always pay, never pay or
randomize), truthful revaluation is not possible in all cases, and we can rule this situation
out. Finally, the comparative statics and limits of η∗ follow by inspection ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4We are looking at the class of mechanisms where there are two
possible probabilities that policy A is chosen: µ(∅,p) and µ(V,p) with µ(∅,p) <µ(V,p).
Vetoes determine which of the two probabilities are chosen and we need to determine the
o p t i m a ln u m b e ro fv e t o e sa sw e l l .
Given that there are s vetoes available, we can characterize the optimal behavior of
the loser￿s representative in each period υ. Note that for winners calling a veto at time
υ is always a (weakly) dominated strategy so that we focus on equilibria where winners
never call vetoes. Consider losers: if c = c in period υ and sυ ≥ 1 then the veto will be
used because in each subsequent period, expected costs yη + z (1 − η) are lower than the
current costs z.
If c = c, then by the argument above, there is a veto because the loss today y is
smaller than the expected loss yη+z (1 − η) for any future period unless there are enough










Now de￿ne the costs associated with this mechanism from the perspective of the original
position. One is the cost of having a veto when there should not be one, ϑ1 and the other








[µ(∅,p) − µ(V,p)](p(w + z) − z)dF(p)
Given these costs, it is easy to see that the probability that exactly s realizations of c will
occur in t periods is a Binomial distribution with mean (1 − η)t and variance η(1 − η)t.
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‚
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tH(s,t)(p(w + z) − z) ≥ 0
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tH(s,t)
¢
(p(w + z) − z) − 1
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υ=1 our mechanism with m(s∗) and n(s∗),
where
s










(p(w + y) − y)+
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(p(w + z) − z)+
1
t
G(s,t)(p(w + y) − y)
‚
dF (p)
implements the optimal veto mechanism. In particular, it is easy to see that m(s) and n(s)
are well-de￿ned, strictly decreasing functions of s such that m(s) >
y
y+w and n(s) < z
w+z
for any 1 ≤ s ≤ t − 1 .F u r t h e r ,i fs =0then m(0) = m∗
MR while n(0) is not well de￿ned.
In this case, any n>m ∗
MR will do since vetoes are not available and n will never be used.
Similarly, if s = t, then n(t)=m∗
MR while m(t) is not well-de￿ned. In this case, any
m<m ∗
MR will do since vetoes will always be used and m is redundant.
For large enough values of t, we can use the Normal approximation to the Binomial
distribution to determine the optimal value of s. Let e Φ (s) be the cumulative of the Normal





H(s,t) ≈ (1 − η)t +
Z s
−∞
e Φ(x)dx − s






(p(w + y) − y)dF (p) −
‡





(p(w + z) − z)dF (p)=0
⇔ e Φ(s)ϑ1 (m(s),n(s)) =
‡
1 − e Φ(s)
·
ϑ2 (m(s),n(s))
48while the second derivative of the objective function with respect to s is everywhere neg-
ative which guarantees that s∗ is the unique global maximum.47
To see that 0 <s ∗ <t , note that if we consider the objective function evaluated at any
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since m(s) <n(t)=m∗
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H(s,t) − (1 − η)
¶
(p(w + z) − z)
‚
dF (p)
The ￿rst term is positive since it is positive for any p>m (s). By the same argument,
the second term is positive for any p<n(s). An identical argument holds for the case in
which s =0 .
Finally, we need to show that the expected utility with this mechanism converges to







bounds above the expected utility with the optimal
VT mechanism. Thus, our result is proven if we show that the former converges to zero.
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‚
dF (p)










(p(w + z) − z)dF(p)
47The proof of this is tedious and is omitted. Details are available upon request.














Φ(0)(1 − η)t =
1−η
2
Given that, it is clear that both |A(p,t)| and |B(p,t)| a r ea l s ob o u n d e db ya ni n t e g r a b l e
function. Further, if limt→∞
1
tG((1 − η)t,t)=0then clearly
lim
t→∞A(p,t)=( p(w + y) − y) and
lim
t→∞
B (p,t)=( p(w + z) − z)
so that we can apply Lebesgue￿s dominated convergence theorem to obtain the desired
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P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 First, consider the announcement stage 3a-3c. This repre-
sents a sequential game between the two representatives. The action spaces are announce-
ments from the set {φ1,φ2}. We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. It is convenient
to de￿ne the expected costs associated with the two policy areas as
ui(p)=ρiy +( 1− ρi)z, i =1 ,2.
48Here we use the Normal approximation because we are mostly interested in asymptotic properties.
However, boundedness for any t clearly applies to the Binomial case as well.
50Assume that n ≥ m where n is the majority rule associated with area 2 and m is the rule
associated with area 1. Note that the winners would like all decisions to be made with
m while the losers would like all decisions to be made by n.S u p p o s e N a t u r e s e l e c t s a
winner to make the ￿rst announcement. Consider the strategies of the loser. If the winner
announces φ2, the the loser announces φ2 as well. If the winner announces φ1,t h el o s e r
challenges this if and only if




The condition says that the expected cost of using the rule m (wrongly) for reforms
belonging to policy area 2 must be greater than the cost of a challenge. Given this, we can
￿nd the winner￿s equilibrium strategies. If condition [LC] is satis￿ed, then it is optimal to





This says that the expected cost of not obtaining policy A in area 1 because rule n is
(wrongly) applied must outweigh the cost of the challenge. If condition [WTC] fails (while
condition [LC] holds), it is optimal to announce φ2. If condition [LC] fails, it is optimal to
announce φ1. Suppose, next, that Nature selects a loser to make the ￿rst announcement.






and that the loser will triggered a challenge by announcing φ2 if and only if




Notice that [LC] and [LTC] are identical etc. We can summarize the analysis as follows:
￿ T h ew i n n e rm o v e sb e f o r et h el o s e r
— [LC] and [WTC] holds: {m,n} and a challenge results and the policy area is
observed.
— [LC] holds, but [WTC] fails: {n,n} and no challenge
— [LC] fails, but [WTC] holds: {m,m} and no challenge
— [LC] fails, but [WTC] fails: {m,m} and no challenge
51￿ The loser moves before the winner
— [WC] and [LTC] holds: {n,m} and a challenge results and the policy area is
observed.
— [WC] holds, but [LTC] fails: {m,m} and no challenge
— [WC] fails, but [LTC] holds: {n,n} and no challenge
— [WC] fails and [LTC] fails: {n,n} and no challenge
It is easy to see that two separate cases can arise:
Case 1 : q
Z n
m




Case 2 : q
Z n
m









in which a challenge will take place no matter who makes the ￿rst announcement and








Here, [WC] and [WTC] fail, but [LC] and [LTC] hold. Consequently, the equilibrium of
the announcement game generates the announcements {φ2,φ 2} no matter who makes the
￿rst announcement. Thus, no challenge is being made and the same rule (n) is applied to








and all four conditions fail. The equilibrium of the announcement game is {m,m} if the
winner announces ￿rst and {n,n} if the loser announces ￿rst. So, with probability 1
2 the
decision is made using the correct policy rule. A similar analysis applies to case 2 which
completes the analysis of the announcement stage.
Second, to determine the optimal constitutional rules, we consider the decision problem












u(p)=pw − (1 − p)[ρ1y +( 1− ρ1)z]





ρ1y +( 1− ρ1)z




ρ2y +( 1− ρ2)z
w + ρ2y +( 1− ρ2)z
The expected utility is EUPA(.) − τ.I nr e g i o n2, the constitutional designer knows that
only one rule is going to be applied at equilibrium and designs this rule to solve
max
ς
(qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2)
Z 1
ς








z − (qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2)(z − y)
w + z − (qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2)(z − y)
.
In region 3, the constitutional designer knows that reforms are randomly allocated to the


























with η =( qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2). Maximization yields
n = m = m
∗
MR =
z − (qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2)(z − y)
w + z − (qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2)(z − y)
.
Thus, in the last two cases, the optimal constitution is eﬀectively the MR constitution
with expected utility EUMR(.). Notice that up to this point, the results are valid for any
function F. However, to complete the proof, we need to assume that F is uniform.
Third, for the constitution with policy area speci￿c rules to be optimal, two conditions







q(z − y)(ρ1 − ρ2)w2
(w + z − ρ2z + ρ2y)(w + ρ1y + z − zρ1)
;






(1 − q)(z − y)(ρ2y + z(1 − ρ2))(ρ1 − ρ2)w
(w + z − ρ2z + ρ2y)(w + ρ1y + z − zρ1)
;
53with A(.) >B (.) if and only if q>
z−ρ2(z−y)
w+z−ρ2(z−y) ∈ (0,1).S e c o n d ,t h ePAconstitution must
be better than the MR constitution, i.e.,
∆ = EUPA(.) − EUMR(.) (A.1)
=
w2q(−z + y)
2 (ρ1 − ρ2)
2 (1 − q)
2(w + z − ρ2(z − y))(w + z − ρ1(z − y))(w + z − (qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2)(z − y))
≥ τ.
The following Lemma is very useful in establishing when these conditions are satis￿ed.
Lemma 1 ∆ ≤ min[A(.),B(.)].
Suppose q<
z−ρ2(z−y)
w+z−ρ2(z−y) => min[A(.),B(.)] = A(.). A tedious calculation shows that
sign[∆ − A(.)] = sign
£
q(z − y)(ρ1 − ρ2)[g(.)]w
2⁄
where g(.) ≡ (ρ1(1 + q)+( 1− q)ρ2)(z − y) − 2(w + z) which is clearly negative. Thus,
∆ <A (.). Next, suppose that q>
z−ρ2(z−y)
w+z−ρ2(z−y)=> min[A(.),B(.)] = B(.).C a l c u l a t e A
tedious calculation shows that
sign[∆ − B(.)] = sign[w(1 − q)(z − y)(ρ1 − ρ2)f(z)]





2 − 2ρ2ρ1q +2 ρ1q +2 ρ
2



















2 +( q(ρ2 − ρ1) − 2ρ2)wy < 0.
To see that a<0,n o t et h a ta =0for ρ1q +( 1− q)ρ2 =1and increasing in ρ1.T h u s ,
since ρi ∈ [0,1] and q ∈ [0,1], ρ1q +( 1− q)ρ2 ≤ 1,i tf o l l o w st h a ta<0. The sign of
b is indeterminate. Note from ViŁta￿s formulas that the two roots of f must be of the








z=y =( w +2 y)(ρ1q +( 1− q)ρ2 − (2 − ρ2)) < 0.T h u s ,i ft h et w or o o t s
are positive they must be smaller than y and so for all z>y , f(z) < 0. We conclude that
∆ <B (.).
The proposition follows directly from the Lemma. For τ ≤ ∆ < min[A(.),B(.)] the
optimal constitution speci￿es two policy area speci￿cr u l e s(m∗
PA,n ∗
PA), while for τ>∆,
the optimal constitution speci￿es only one rule, m∗
MR.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s6a n d7To establish these two Propositions, it is useful ￿rst
to establish the following Lemma.
54Lemma 2 Let ρ1 >ρ 2, 0 <q<1 and ∞ >z>y . The critical cost ∆ is a diﬀerentiable
function of z and ρ1 with the following properties
1.F o rρ1 < 1, there exist a value ∞ > z>ysuch that for z ∈ (y,z] ∂∆
∂z > 0 and
negative otherwise.
2. For ρ1 =1 ,∂∆
∂z > 0 for all z>y .








−w2q(z − y)(ρ1 − ρ2)
2 (1 − q)(a1z3 + a2z2 + a3z + a4)
2(w + z − ρ2(z − y))
2 (w + z − ρ1(z − y))
2 (w + z − (qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2)(z − y))
2
with
a1 =( 1 − ρ2)(1− ρ1)(1− ρ1q − (1 − q)ρ2) > 0









2(1 − q)+2 ( 3 ρ2 − q − 1)
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From equation (A.1), we note that ∆(y)=∆(–∞)=0and that ∆(z) > 0 for all z>y .
It is clear that ∂∆
∂z =0at z = y.F o r z>y , the sign of ∂∆
∂z is determined by the cubic
equation (a1z3 + a2z2 + a3z + a4). Now, it will at least have one real root greater than y
(because we know that ∆(y)=∆(–∞)=0and that ∆(z) > 0 for all z>y ), but it may
have three roots. To rule this out it is suﬃcient to establish that a3 is negative and apply









2(1 − q)+2 ( 3 ρ2 − q − 1)
¢
ρ1 +3( 1− q)ρ
2
2 +2( q − 2)ρ2
¢
< 0
Notice that h(ρ2)=−3ρ2 (ρ2 − 1)(−2+ρ2) < 0, h(1) = −ρ2q + q +2 ρ2 − 2 < 0.S i n c e
3q(1−ρ2) > 0, h(–∞)=+ ∞.T h u s ,h(ρ1) < 0 for all ρ1 ∈ [ρ2,1]. Hence, we conclude that
there can only be one positive root to a1z3 +a2z2 +a3z +a4, and, as a consequence, there
is critical value of z where the derivative of ∆(z) changes sign as stated in the Lemma.
55Part 2 of the Lemma follows by noting the ρ1 =1implies that a1 = a2 =0and thus that
∂∆




(1 − q)(2(w + z)+( ρ1(1 + q)+ρ2(1 − q))(y − z))
(w + z − ρ1(z − y))
2 (w + z − (qρ1 +( 1− q)ρ2)(z − y))
2 > 0.
Proposition 6 follows from Part 1 of Lemma 2. Let τz =m a x z ∆(z). Then the two critical
values of z (z1,z 2)a r ed e ￿ned as the two solutions to the equation ∆(z)=τ for τ ∈ (0,τz).
The corollary follows from part 2 of the Lemma 2 by noting that the equation ∆(z)=τ
allows only one solution z3 for ρ1 =1 . P r o p o s i t i o n7f o l l o w sf r o mp a r t3o fL e m m a2 .
Let τρ1 = ∆(ρ1) at ρ1 =1 . Then the critical value ρ1 is the solution to ∆(ρ1)=τ for
τ ∈ (0,τρ1) where ρ1 = ρ2 at τ =0and ρ1 =1at τ = τρ1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 To determine the optimal AFB constitution the ￿rst thing
to note is that, following the previous analysis, optimal constitutions, contingent on b ω,












The reason for this is that either the information conveyed by the announcements is such






is the best option





is the best option.
Consider now the losers￿ representative. The loser would always prefer n =1whenever
ω = ω while he would prefer n = z









































while it will prefer n =1otherwise. Losers want to set n =1whenever ω = ω because it
makes A less likely to obtain than setting n = z
w+z.I fω = ω, however, setting n =1will
guarantee that policies with c will not pass but at the same time allows policies with c to
pass with probability 1 −
y
y+w). On the other hand, a n<1 will trigger a crisis which, if
the chance of its success is large enough, might be even better. Thus, if α is small enough,
losers will want to have a constitution with n<1 because they want the crisis to happen.
With winners, they will always want n<1 with ω = ω because a crisis cannot happen
and given that they want n to be as small as possible, they prefer n = z
z+w to n =1 .I f
ω = ω,t h e yw i l lw a n tt os e tn = z
z+w whenever
















56where α0 >α 2 since z>y .These results allow us to characterize completely the preferences
winners and losers have over n, as a function of α and the actual realization ω. These are
summarized below:
if α ≤ α2 then
‰
if ω = ω then z
w+z ￿W 1 and z
w+z ≺WC 1
if ω = ωt h e n z
w+z ￿WC 1 and z
w+z ≺W 1
if α2 <α<α 0 then
‰
if ω = ω then z
w+z ￿W 1 and z
w+z ≺WC 1
if ω = ωt h e n z
w+z ≺WC 1 and z
w+z ≺W 1
if α ≥ α0 then
‰
if ω = ω then z
w+z ￿W 1 and z
w+z ≺WC 1
if ω = ωt h e n z
w+z ≺WC 1 and z
w+z ￿W 1
Not being able to verify the identity of the announcers, and speci￿cally whether they
are winners or losers, the constitution can only select amongst the two possible values of
n by making them conditional on whether b ω = {ω,ω},{ω,ω} or{ω,ω}.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
the constitution cannot distinguish between the case in which the winners￿ representative
announces ω and the losers￿ announces ω from the case in which the losers￿ representative
announces ω and the winners￿, announces ω.
Consider the case α2 <α<α 0, and the following constitutional mechanism:











then the winner￿s representative has weakly dominant strategy in choosing announcement
ω whenever ω = ω and announcement ω whenever ω = ω while the losers￿ representa-
tive has a weakly dominant strategy in selecting announcement ω regardless of ω.T h i s












whenever ω = ω and this is an optimal mechanism for the constitutional
designers.













such mechanism exists. First of all, any such mechanism must be such that one of two
possibilities (i.e. n =1or n = z
z+w) is associated with at least one announcement pro-
￿le in {{ω,ω},{ω,ω},{ω,ω}} and the other possibility is associated with the other two












with the other two. This will not work, because if the losers￿ represen-
tative announces second, then whenever ω = ω, it can always replicate the announcement





. On the other hand, whenever







. Since the mechanism cannot selects who announces
￿rst because identities are not veri￿able, this mechanism provides the correct information
57with probability 1
2 (the probability that the winner￿s representative announces second)
only. Similar arguments apply for all other possible mechanisms and for the case α ≥ α0.
Thus, we￿ve shown that for α ≥ α0 and α ≤ α2 any mechanism only reveals the true
state of nature with probability 1
2. We now show that this implies that for these values of



























where, by de￿nition u1 >u 2. Then a mechanism that reveals the truth with only 1
2













































u1 (γα+( 1− γ))
or






u1 (γα+( 1− γ))
¤
Proof of Proposition 10 Consider representative k and suppose ￿rst that k rep-
resents the losers. Now, let {ml,nl,r l} represent {mj,nj,r j} if vj ≥ r and {m,n,r}
otherwise. We know that any constitution {mk,nk,r k} proposed by k will pass only if
vk ≥ rl. The choice is between a constitution that will be unanimously agreed upon or
one that will get the losers￿ vote49.T h e ￿rst possibility is always there as long as both
ml > 0 and nl < 1 because, given that z>ythen losers can always oﬀer winners a
lower m in exchange for a higher n which will be a Pareto improvement over the previous
constitutions. In particular, it is optimal for losers to propose mk and nk where the latter
49The case in which no proposal is made is a special case in which a constitution identical to the previous
one is proposed.
58is highest possible value of n such that
η(1 − ml)+( 1− η)(1− nl) ≤ η(1 − mk)+( 1− η)(1− nk)
and mk ≥ 0,nk ≤ 1
The second possibility, for which we must have p ≤ 1 − rl is to select any mk > 1 − rl,
nk > 1 − rl because this guarantees that A will not pass.50 Which one of these two cases
will be chosen depends on whether the constitution that makes A impossible (but requires
that p ≤ 1 − rl) is preferable to the one that is agreed upon unanimously (but still allows
for A).
Suppose now that k represents the winner. Again, renegotiation that will be unani-
mously agreed upon is always possible if along lines similar to the ones described above if
both ml > 0 and nl < 1. Now, it is optimal for winners to propose mk and nk where the
former is smallest possible value of m such that
η(1 − ml)(−y)+( 1− η)(1− nl)(−z) ≤ η(1 − mk)(−y)+( 1− η)(1− nk)(−z)
and mk ≥ 0,nk ≤ 1
For a constitution to achieve just the winners￿ vote, we must have p ≥ rl and given that,
it is optimal to set mk ≤ rl and nk ≤ rl whenever ω = ω thus guaranteeing A. If ω = ω, it
is still optimal to set mk ≤ rl but now we have nk ≤ rl iﬀ α ≥ η and nk =1otherwise. To
see this, note that by setting nk ≤ rl, the constitution allows the winner to get w for sure
unless the crisis that will follow is successful. So the expected utility is αw.A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,
by selecting the best possible constitution that does not allow for a crisis - mk ≤ rl and
nk =1- the winners get w only with probability η, the probability that c = c. Clearly, the
￿rst option is better than the second one iﬀ α ≥ η.
Again, winners will have to choose before p is realized whether their expected utility
from unanimous renegotiation is higher or lower than that from a change that only winners
will vote for.
For the constitutional choice {mj,nj,r j}, it is immediate to see that the same consid-
erations apply.
We now focus on the problem faced by the constitutional designers behind the veil of
ignorance. It is immediate to see that it is always optimal to set m =
y
y+w. Consider now
the choice n =1 , and r = z
w+z. This particular choice implies that if j represents the losers,
there will be no change to the constitution. To see this, note ￿rst that n is j￿s preferred
option, and that m and r are such that if 1 − p ≥ r, then 1 − p>mwhich means that
there is no reason to change m because whenever that could be done, then A would not
50Since there is no opportunity for further amendment, rk is irrelevant.
59obtain anyway. No renegotiation can take place because n =1 . Finally, there is no reason
to change r because whenever (1 − p) ≥ r, then we cannot have p ≥ r and this makes
it impossible that the winners￿ representative k can make any changes that only winners
would approve of. Thus, whenever j represents the losers, either no change is possible or
no change is desired.
Now suppose j represents the winners. If ω = ω then mj,nj ≤ r and rj ≥ r is optimal
because it guarantees A by choosing the appropriate majority rules and by making sure
that losers can never make any further changes. If ω = ω and α ≥ η we have the same
while no change will be necessary whenever α<η .Again, in either case, no renegotiation
is possible because n =1 .
The whole analysis implies that losers j or k will never change the constitution while
winners j or k will change it whenever ω = ω or ω = ω and α ≥ η. To see that this is
the optimal AM constitution note that this constitution is outcome-equivalent to a VFB
constitution where instead of having the cut-oﬀ value α0,w eh a v et h ec u t - o ﬀ η<α 0.T h u s ,
this replicates the optimal VFB constitution except for those cases in which α ∈ [η,α0)











. It is immediate to see that there is no other AM constitution that improves
upon this ¤
Proof of Proposition 11 The optimal rules are derived as follows. De￿ne
uh = ρ1 (phw − (1 − ph)w)+( 1− ρ1)(phw − (1 − ph)zh),
vh = ρ2 (phw − (1 − ph)w)+( 1− ρ2)(phw − (1 − ph)zh),
w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a tw = y to simplify the algebra. For a NCB constitution and for
min{m,n} ≥ 1




























with solution given in equations (7.1) and (7.2) and expected utility EU(m∗
NCB,n ∗
NCB).
We note that n∗
NCB >m ∗
NCB ≥ 1
2 con￿rming our assumption. For the CB constitution,

































For the two PCB, the constitutional designer maximizes at combination of the two ob-
jective functions for the CB and the NCB constitution and expected utility of a PCB









































T)(1 − ρ2)2 − (zS + zT)w(1 − ρ2
2) − 5zSzT(1 − ρ2)2 − w2(1 + ρ2)2)
27((1 + ρ2)2w +( 1− ρ2)(zS + zT))
2 (z1(1 − ρ2)+w(1 + ρ2)(zT(1 − ρ2)+w(1 + ρ2)
.















We see that 1
2
ρ2zS−zS+w+ρ2w
ρ2−1 <z S.T h u s ,∆1 > 0 if zT >
2(1−ρ2)zT+(1+ρ2)w
(1−ρ2) ≡ zT.W es e et h a t












































T)(1 − ρ1)2 − (zS + zT)w(1 − ρ2
1) − (1 + ρ1)2w2 − 5zSzT(1 − ρ1)2)
27(2(1 + ρ1)w +( 1− ρ1)zS +( 1− ρ1)zT)
2 ((1 − ρ1)zT +( 1+ρ1)w)((1 + ρ1)w +( 1− ρ1)zS)







1−ρ1 . Clearly, the relevant
root is
b zT ≡
(1 + ρ1)w +2 ( 1− ρ1)zS
1 − ρ1
> zT













NCB) and the other way around for zT ≤ b zT.




































































































This proves part 3 of the proposition ¤
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